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1. ATTACKS ON THE JUDICIARY 
It is increasingly common for jurists, rather than their allegedly 
erroneous rulings, to be the target of wrath by disappointed partisans. Within 
the last few months, in pleadings and correspondel'r;e, justices on various 
Texas appellate courts have been compared to "Pestilence, Death, [and] 
Famine," mocked as "bought and paid for employees of the Wall Street rich 
... and the country club set," and lambasted for rendering "pro-rapist, pro-big-
insurance-defense firm" decisions. l These derogatory taunts by attorneys 
• J.D., University of Notre Dame; LL.M .. Yale University; LL.D .• St. Vincent College (Pa). 
Professor of Law, St. Mary's University. San Antonio. Texas. Member. American Law Institute. 
Commissioner. Federal Judicial Fellows Commission. Fulbright Senior Scholar. People's Republic of 
China. 1998. This paper was presented in a preliminary form to the Annual Meeting of the Judicial 
Section of the State Bar of Texas in September 1997. Editorial assistance was provided by several law 
students: Michael French, Jeffrey Mathews. Jason Kipness. Tamara Pitts, West Winter. Margaret Hopson. 
and David Lindeman. 
I. Robert Elder, Jr, The Art of the Brief, Disrespectfully Submitted, TEX. LAW .• Aug. II, 1997, 
at 2. Elder goes on to say: 
Whatever else one can say about them, [attorneys I Robert Halliard, Michael Shore and 
Marynell Maloney do possess a certain rhetorical flair: 
"Outlined against a hazy July sky. the four horsemen rode again last Wednesday, July 9, 
1997. You know them Pestilence, Death, Famine and this Texas Supreme Court: Hilliard 
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represent only part of what appears to be a much broader attack on the 
independence and integrity of the judiciary.2 There are many examples. 
During the most recent presidential election, a decision that evidence in a drug 
case was inadmissible led some of the presidential candidates to call for the 
resignation of a federal judge in New York, rather than merely for the reversal 
of his ruling. 3 Later in the year, in Texas, an expert witness disappointed with 
a Houston judge's decision that religious garb could not be worn in a state 
courtroom sought to have the judge disciplined by the Commission on Judicial 
Conduct rather than have the correctness of the ruling reviewed on appea1. 4 
More recently, the Majority Whip of the United States House of 
Representatives charged that a San Antonio federal judge should be 
impeached for apparently no reason other than that he had granted a 
preliminary injunction in a discrimination suit arising from elections in Val 
Verde County, a decision with which the Majority Whip disagreed. s Other 
federal judges in Tennessee and California have also been targeted for 
potential removal because of their alleged "judicial activism."6 
These efforts to personalize, rather than professionalize, the process of 
judicial criticism suggest the development of an unfortunate trend of abusing 
judges for personal or political advantage. In some respects this trend is 
similar to the "scorched earth" tactics that became commonplace in the late 
wrote in a July 24 motion for rehearing of a Bendectin birth-defect case. 
"You are now considered bought and paid for employees of the Wall Street rich, the 
insurance conglomerates and the country club set you fawn over," Shore wrote in a letter to the 
Supreme Court after reading its opinion in a hospital I icensing case in which he wasn '1 even 
involved. "Defense lawyers I work with are laughing at you. considering you their captive 
pets." 
"No wonder the court has elected not to publish its opinion in this malter' It must be 
embarrassing to take such a decidedly pro-rapist, pro-big-insurance-defense-fmn position with 
so appallingly non-existent legal or logic.li Jasis," Maloney wrote 10 a motion for rehearing hl 
the 4th Court of Appeals after it had ruled against her client in a nursing home case 
These items aren't just inf1ammato1) passages highlighted to make a point-the \\fitings 
of all three lawyers are shot through with this type of rancor and passion 
fd.; see also "Captive Pets" at Supreme Co urI. TEX. LAW, July 21. 1997, at 2. 
2. See N. Lee Cooper, President Ends Term with Call/or ReSistance fa LeRal ServIces CulS and 
10 AI/acks on Judiciary, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 4,1997, at CI. CI8 (" 'The biggest challenge to the legal 
profession and to the justice system as the new century approaches is the continuing attack upon the 
federal judiciary.' "); see also Federal Wril Frees La1>yer, SA~ A~T0:'nO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 4, 1997, 
at 28. After a lawyer was sanctioned by the Texas Supreme Court and ordered to pay $1000 to the lawyers 
on the other side of a case, he sent a check to the court, which was made "payable to any Texas Supreme 
Court Justice." fd. The Supreme Court found the lawyer in contempt. See id. He was arrested, placed 
in jail, then later freed by a federal court writ. See id. 
3. See Kathy Barrett Carter, Polilicians' Election Year Attacks on Judges Draw Concern/rom 
the ABA, STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK NJ.), Aug. 5, 1996, at 12, available in 1996 WL 7958618. 
4. See Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Banned Yarmulke Leads 10 Judicial Conduct Commission 
Complaint, TEX. LAW., Sept. 30,1996, at 5. 
5. See Vincent R. Johnson, Judicial Polilics.· Unfair Play, TEX. LAW., Apr. 14, 1997, at 28. 
6. See Marcia Coyle, Impeachment a/Judges/or "Activism" Mulled, NAT'L LJ, Mar. 24, 1997, 
at A 12; Harvey Berkman, Spiking Judgesfor Rulings, NAT'L LJ, Jun. 30, 1997, at AI 
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1980s and early 1990s in certain fields of civillitigation.7 The trend raises the 
prospect of replacing civility and moderation in public discourse with 
harshness and excess. These developments also threaten to undermine the 
public standing and effectiveness of the judiciary 8 
Of course, criticism of the judiciary is not new. One thinks of past 
attacks leveled against the lower federal court judges who worked to make the 
civil rights movement's promise of racial equality a reality,9 or attacks against 
United States Supreme Court justices, such as Chase,1O Taney,11 Warren,12 and 
Douglas. l ) But the recent spate of criticism has a harder edge to it, and 
surprisingly, it is sometimes more willingly tolerated. For example, 
intemperate language that just a few years ago would have caused a court to 
reject the filing of a motion may today go unchalienged. 14 Moreover, recusal 
motions, which used to be rare, now have become routine. IS At a minimum, 
it can safely be said that if ajudge today is subject to harsh attacks for conduct 
no more grievous than rendering an incorrect decision, it seems likely that one 
7. See generally Thomas M. Reavley. Rambo LlIIgalors Pillmg Aggressive Tactics Against 
Legal £Ihies, 17 PEPP. L REV. 637 (1990) (discussing the preference for melodramatic performances by 
trial lawyers and the growing intolerance of such techniques). 
8. See Jeffrey Rosinek. Polilieal Judge-Bashing Endangers Our System. NAT'L LJ., Aug. 25, 
1997, at A18. 
9. See, e.g. ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY (1978) 
(discussing Judge Johnson's role in federal civil rights litigation in Alabama). 
10. Justice Samuel Chase was not only widely criticized. but also impeached and tried, though not 
convicted. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQl'ESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF 
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992), reviewed in Vincent R. Johnson, The 
Moderate Rehnquist, 17 YT. L REV 267,268 (1992). 
II See WILLlA\l H. REHNQUIST. THE SUPREME COl.'RT How IT WAS, How IT Is 149 (1987) 
12. See BER:-.IARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A 
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 124 (J 983) 
13. See DA 'vlD M. O·BRIE:-;. STORM CENTER: THE SUPRE\IE COURT IN A\iERlCAN POLITICS 97-99 
(1986). 
14. See Theodore :v1ack. Court Disrespect 'Jistastejid. TEX. LAW., Aug. 25,1997, at 26, Mack 
states that the Texas Supreme Court's "apparent decision to benignly ignore attacks is a fairly recent one" 
and notes that, 15 years ago. a motion for rehearing was rejected tor filing because of its intemperate tone. 
lei. The more recent motion said that the court's denial of a writ was " 'unprincipled' and that the court 
could not maintain its 'intellectual integrity' and allow the decision of the [lower court] to stand." Jd. Of 
course, not all courts are inclined to ignore abusive language. See In re Maloney, 949 S.W.2d 385. 386 
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997. n." .h.) (stating that an attorney's assertions, in a motion for rehearing and 
in response to an order to show cause, were direct attacks on the integrity of the justices of the court and 
warranted the forwarding of the matter to the State Bar for disciplinary proceedings). Some bar 
associations are redoubling their eflons to defend judges from unfair criticism. See Richard L Fruin, Jr., 
Defending Judicial Independence and Opening Up Courts, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 4, 1997, at C I 0 (discussing 
ABA efforts). 
15. See John Council. Recusal Roulelle, TEX. LAW., Sept. I, 1997. at 1. Council quotes the 
presiding judge for the First Administrative Judicial Region in Dallas, who now hears an estimated 100 
recusal hearings a year. as sa) ing: "[W]e didn't use to have this problem 25 years ago. Most are 
absolutely frivolous. I think it kind of shows the decline in collegiality of the bar and the respect for 
judges." Id. 
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who engages in ethically questionable conduct will be even more severely 
taken to task, producing greater harm to public confidence in the courts. 
It has always been important for judges to observe high ethical standards. 
But in the combative atmosphere that now prevails, judges at all levels need 
to be especially vigilant to avoid ethical improprieties that may unnecessarily 
provoke bad publicity. 
II. CANON 5: REFRAINING FROM INAPPROPRIATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
For Texas judges, no field of endeavor is more fraught with potential for 
an ethical misstep than campaigning for office. The standards differentiating 
permissible forms of political activity from those which are forbidden are 
finely drawn and not easy to apply to the dynamic process of running a 
campaign. In addition, there is relatively little in the way of interpretive 
guidance, for precedent constr: 1 ing the pertinent ethics rules is scarce. 
Moreover, when mistakes occur, they frequently take place in the public eye. 
The starting point for conducting an ethical judicial campaign is Canon 
5 of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. Although its various provisions will 
be quoted and discussed below, this canon is worth printing in full at the 
beginning of this paper, for it is the essential benchmark in this field of 
judicial ethics. It provides: 
(1) A judge or judicial candidate shall not make statements that indicate 
an opinion on any issue that may be subject to judicial interpretation by the 
office which is being sought or held, except that discussion of an individual's 
judicial philosophy is appropriate if conducted in a manner which does not 
suggest to a reasonable person a probable decision on any particular case. 
(2) A judge or judicial candidate shall not: 
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office ~ ~6arding 
judicial duties other than the faithful and impartial performance 
of the duties of the office, but may state a position regarding the 
conduct of administrative duties; 
(ii) knowingly or recklessly misrepresent the identity, 
qualifications, present position, or other fact concerning the 
candidate or an opponent. 
(3) A judge or judicial candidate shall not authorize the public use of 
his or her name endorsing another candidate for any public office, except that 
either may indicate support for a political party. A judge or judicial 
candidate may attend political events and express his or her views on 
political matters in accord with this Canon and Canon 3 BO 0).16 
16. TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5, reprinted in TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. 
B (Vernon SUpp. 1998). 
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Canon 5 applies not only to sitting judges, 17 but also to candidates for the 
judiciary.18 A judge who violates Canon 5 or other provisions in the Code of 
Judicial Conduct is subject to discipline by the State Commission on Judicial 
Conduct. 19 Similarly, a lawyer seeking judicial office may be disciplined by 
the State Bar of Texas for failing to comply with the terms of Canon 5 or other 
relevant provisions of the judicial code. 20 Among those "other relevant 
provisions" are presumably those portions of Canon 2 which state: 
A. A judge shall comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner 
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
B ..... A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the 
private interests of the judge or others.'1 
These general principles form leitmotifs in the precedent that has emerged 
with respect to judicial campaigning. 
The obligation of a judge or judicial candidate to follow the law22 
imposes a duty to comply with various statutory provisions bearing upon fund 
raising and the like, such as those contained in the Texas Judicial Campaign 
Fairness ActY However, an examination of those statutory constraints on 
judicial campaigning will be left to another article. The discussion below 
focuses on topics falling within the purview of Canon 5 and other provisions 
of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. In considering these subjects, it is 
useful to bear in mind that case law and advisory opinions have traditionally 
held judicial candidates to very high standards of conduct, and they are likely 
to continue to do SO.24 Consequently, in charting a campaign, it is wise to err 
on the side of caution in deciding what is ethically allowed. 
17. Canon 6 of the Texas Code ofJudicial Conduct specifies which judges and justices are subject 
to some or all of its terms. Jd., Canon 6. 
18. Canon 6(G)( I) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct provides: "Any person seeking elective 
judicial oflice listed in Canon 6A( I) shall be ><1bjeet to the same standards of Canon 5 that are required 
of members of the judiciary" Jd, Canon 6(G)(I) 
19. Jd, Canon 6(G)(2) 
20 See id. Canon 6(G)(J); see also Rule 802(b) Dr the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional 
Conduct which states: "A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable 
provisions of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct." TEX DISCIPLINARY R. l'ROF'L CO."DL'CT 8.02(b), 
reprinted In TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon Supp. 1998) (TEX. ST,\ TE BAR R. art. 
X, ~ 9) 
2 J. TEX. CODE JCD. CONDceT, Canon 2. 
22. See id, Canon 2(A) 
23. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 253.151-.176 (Vernon Supp. 1998). 
24. The Advisory Opinions on Judicial Ethics cited and quoted in this article are issued by the 
Committee on Judicial Ethics orthe State Bar of Texas. They are published in the Annual Report of the 
Texas Judicial System, which can be ordered through the Texas Judicial Council Oflice of Court 
Administration in Austin. Advisory Opinions 168-203 are also available on the Internet. See Texas 
Electronic Ethics Reporter (last modified Dec. 8, 1997) <http://www.law.uh. edulethics/>. 
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At various points, this article argues that, on particular facts, discipline 
cannot be imposed on judges or judicial candidates for constitutional or other 
reasons. This does not mean that persons involved in judicial races should 
engage in those forms of conduct. The interests of society are often best 
served by those who conduct themselves in accordance with standards of 
behavior far exceeding the lower range of what is protected by the 
Constitution. 
The analysis which follows occasionally cites decisions from other states 
as guidance relevant to judicial campaigns in TexasY It must be remembered, 
however, that in the field of electing judges, Texas, in many respects, has 
charted an independent course. Not surprisingly, the terms of Canon 5 of the 
Texas Code of Judicial Conduct vary considerably from the language of the 
American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Condud6 and from the 
provisions based on that model that are currently in force in many states. 27 
Consequently, care must be exercised in relying on out-of-state precedent 
dealing with the political activities of judges and judicial candidates. Certain 
issues relating to judicial campaigns fall within the ambit of the free-speech 
and free-press provisions of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 28 To the extent that out-of-state decisions soundly renect those 
constitutional principles, they should, of course, carry significant weight in 
Texas. 
III. STATEMENTS MADE DURING JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 
A. Knowingly False Statements 
Judges who are lawyers, as well as lawyers running for judicial office, 
are subject to the requirements of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional 
Conduct, including the broad pfvvisions of Rule 8.04(a)(3V9 This rule 
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not ... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."30 
In addition, as noted above, Canon 5(2)(ii) of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct states that "[a] judge or judicial candidate shall not ... knowingly or 
25. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing misrepresentations and freedom of 
expression). 
26. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDL:CT (1990) The legislative history of the 1990 ABA code 
is set forth in LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE (1992). 
27. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 356 (2d ed. 1995) ("[N]o 
Code provision has more variations among the states that have adopted the ... [ABA Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct] than Canon 5."). 
28. See id. at 337. 
29. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 8,04(a)(3) 
30. Id. 
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recklessly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position, or other 
fact concerning the candidate or an opponent.")1 
Consequently, if a judge or judicial candidate knowingly makes a false 
statement offact, there are at least two potential bases for imposing discipline. 
Not surprisingly, there is authority that a former judge cannot imply in 
political advertising that he is a current judge.32 So too, a judge who seeks 
reelection and is defeated cannot use the words "reelect" or "keep" on 
campaign materials used in a subsequent race against an incumbent on another 
court.3) 
In In re Donohoe, the court held that an intentional and deliberate pattern 
of making misstatements of fact in connection with a campaign for a position 
on a court of appeals warranted censure and that the use of false campaign 
materials justified a separate reprimand.34 In that case, the judicial candidate, 
among other things, falsely asserted that the court of appeals had never 
reversed a trial judge if the appellant was represented by a woman. J5 In fact, 
the candidate herself had obtained a reversal from a panel on which the judge 
she was challenging sat.36 The candidate also published, as part of her 
campaign materials, a letter written by a fellow attorney, which the candidate 
had materially altered by removing the essence of three paragraphs.37 In 
affirming the imposition of discipline, the court reasoned: 
We are dealing with a delicate balancing of rights involving the public, 
the incumbent judge, and the lawyer candidate for judicial office. On the one 
hand the courts, as an institution, are entitled to the respect due to the office 
because the acceptance of judicial decisions ultimately depends upon the 
citizens' belief in the integrity and impartiality of the courts. On the other 
hand, the members of the judiciary are subject to legitimate and accurate 
criticism and evaluation. A candidate for judicial office has a right to 
challenge an incumbent judge's ability, deciSions andjudicial conduct, but 
it must be done fairly, accurately and upon facts, not false representations. 
31. TEX. CODE Juo. CO;;OuCT, Canon 5(2)(ii). 
32. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex .. Op. 193 (1996). reprinted in 68 TEX. JUD. 
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. AO.Y1IN. TEX. Juo. SYS. ANN. REp. 70 (1996) (stating that Canon 5(2)(ii) would be 
violated if a former Justice of the Peace implied in political advertising that he was a current Justice of the 
Peace); Comm. on Jud. Ethics. State Bar of Tex., Op. 195 (1996) reprinted in 68 TEX. JUD. COUNCIL & 
OFF CT, ADMIN. TEX, JUD. SYS, Al'.'N, REp. 71 (1996) (stating that an individual who has resigned from 
a County Court at Law bench to run for a District Court bench and who is currently practicing law cannot 
use the title "Judge" in political advertisements or use election materials from previous campaigns for 
county bench races that say only "Vote for Judge __ " because such conduct would violate Canon 
5(2)(ii)). 
33. See Comm, on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 135 (1990) reprinted in 62 TEX. JUD. 
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. Sys. ANN. REp, 125 (1990). 
34. 580 P.2d 1093, 1098-99 (Wash. J 978). 
35. See id. at 1095. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. at 1098. 
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The voters are entitled to a fair statement and evaluation of the qualifications 
of the candidates. 
By the attorneys' oath, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of 
Professional Responsibility the candidates must maintain the respect due the 
courts of justice. Judges should not be subjected to false allegations about 
particular decisions. A judge's ability to render a reasoned decision should 
not be clouded by the fear that a challenger can twist words or allege 
distorted facts in an election campaign. 
We agree that a person does not surrender freedom of expression rights 
when becoming a licensed attorney .... However, we do not believe that the 
First Amendment protects one who utters a statement with knowledge of its 
falsity, even in the context of a judicial campaign 38 
A judge or judicial candidate cannot circumvent the rule against 
communication of a known falsehood by acting through the agency of a third 
person.39 Rule 8.04(a)(1) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional 
Conduct expressly states that "[aJ lawyer shall not ... violate these rules 
(including Rule 8.04(a)(3), the rule against dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation], knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another."40 Thus, a judge or judicial candidate may be held 
liable for knowingly false statements disseminated by a political committee, 
provided the involvement of the judge or candidate in the committee's 
misconduct is adequately established.41 
Under general tort principles, an ambiguous statement can support an 
action for deceit. 42 If the statement's false meaning is accepted by the listener 
and known to the maker of the statement, and if the maker intends to convey 
the false meaning or is indifferent as to how the statement '.vill be und\;;l.;tood, 
an action willlie.43 Similar principles apply to statements made in the course 
of ajudicial campaign. Thus, a candidate for judicial office is not permitted 
to say that an opponent was "removed" from office when, in fact, the opponent 
had not been expelled for misconduct but merely defeated for reelection. 44 
38. Id. at 1097 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) 
39. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 8.04(a)( 1). 
40. Id 
41. Cf In re Beatty, 517 N.E.2d 1065, 1069-70 (ilL 1987) (holding that a complaint charging 
attorneys with having violated disciplinary rules through the conduct of a political committee, which 
allegedly had distributed false statements concerning incumbent judicial candidates, failed to allege 
sufficient allegations of fact to state a disciplinary cause of action). 
42. See RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS ~ 527 (1977) 
43. See id. 
44. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics. State Bar of Tex., Op. 169 (1994), reprinted in 66 TEX. JUD. 
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. SyS A'IN. REp. 125-26 (1994). 
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Recent Supreme Court decisions make clear that the United States 
Constitution provides no blanket protection for expressions of opinion.45 If 
a statement in the form of an opinion (e.g., "In my opinion. the incumbent 
judge has swindled the public") carries with it a false implicit statement offact 
(i.e., that t'le judge has committed particular acts of dishonesty), it may serve 
as the predicate for imposition of legal sanctions.4b These rules are now well 
established in the tort fields of defamation and misrepresentation. l " and it 
should be assumed that the same analysis will be followed in the imposition 
of professional discipline. 
It may be difficult to detemline \vhether a statement of opinion implicitly 
asserts false facts. Courts regularly struggle with that question and have 
developed various tests as aids to the analYSIS of particular situations. Courts 
typically consider the "general tenor" of the statement. the setting in \Vh ich it 
was made, and whether the speaker used precise or imprecise language.'18 If 
the listener is unacquainted with the factual context about which the statement 
is made, a court will be more willing to find that the statement carries an 
implicit assertion of fact than if the recipient is already fully familiar with the 
relevant data.49 Likewise, a statement which is made under circumstances in 
which the listener should anticipate the use of fiery or exaggerated rhetoric 
will less likely be termed a statement of fact.'\! Ordinari ly, statements are not 
45. See, e.g, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co, 497 U.S. 1,5,17 (1990) (holding that there is no 
constitutionally based "wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion,' " 
and that a statement of opinion which implies a false assertion of fact may be defamatory in the case of 
a sports commentator who wrote in a newspaper column that two school of1icials testifying at an athletic 
sanctioning board had lied) 
Jd. 
46. See id. at 20. 
47. See, e.g, RESTATE\lENT (Second) OF TORTS ~ 539 (1977) Section 539 provides 
(I) A statement of opinion as to facts not disciclscd and not otherwise known to the 
recipient may, if it is reasonable to do so, be interpreted b) him as an implied ,tatement 
(a) that the facts known to the maker are nut incompatible with his opinion: or 
(b) that he knows facts suf1lcient to justify him in t,-,~r';~g it. 
(2) In detenmining whether a statement of opinion may reasonably be so interpreted, the 
recipient's belief as to ,\hether the maker: as an ad\ erse interest is important 
48. See 600 \Vest I I 5th SI. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d 930, 934·38 (~y 1992) 
(concluding that statements that a proposed restaurant "cknigrated" the building, tim a lease and 
'proposition" were fraudulent and "smelled of bribery and corruption," and that the lease "as "illegal" 
could not constitutionally be the subject of a defamation action because none of the statements impl ied 
knowledge of a specific criminal transaction, the statements used tigurative language, they were in some 
respects obviously exaggerated, and they were made at a heated public hearing). 
49, See, e.g., Pritsker v Brudnoy, 452 N.E.2d 227 (\13SS 1983) In ?rilsker, a restaurant critic 
stated on a radio station program that the owners of a dining establishment were "unconscionably rude and 
vulgar, , ,PIGS." Jd. at 228. In holding that the critic's opinion did not carry with it an implicit statement 
offac!, the court found it important that the restaurant was open to the public and there was no suggestion 
that other individuals could not visit the establishment and draw their own conclusions. See id. at 229·31. 
If, in contrast, the speaker had stated or implied that the statement was based on information that was 
otherwise unavailable to the recipients of the communication, a ditTerent result might have followed. 
50. See Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co., 497 US 1. 17 ( 1990) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v, 
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actionable if they lack specificity, or merely indicate that the speaker thinks 
ill of another. In the end, however, the issue of whether an expression of 
opinion carries with it a false statement of fact is, by itself, merely a ldctual 
question for the fact finder to resolve. A judge or judicial candidate who 
utters unfavorable opinions about an opponent runs the risk that that question 
will be decided in a way that permits the imposition of discipline under the 
usual rules governing the dissemination of false information. 
B. False Statements Recklessly, Negligently, or Innocent!."¥' ,Hade 
Knowingly false utterances must be distinguished from other false 
statements which are not known to be untrue, but are uttered as a result of lack 
of care (negligently or recklessly) or perhaps even innocently. It seems 
doubtful that a lawyer will be subject to discipline for making an innocent or 
even negligent misrepresentation, for courts have routinely refused to so 
hold.51 If, however, a high degree offault is shown (i.e., recklessness as to the 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988); Letter Carriers v. Austin. 418 U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. 
Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler. 398 U.S. 6,13-14 (1970» 
51. See, e.g, State Bar v. Lerner, 859 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. App.-Houston [I st Dist.j1993, no writ). 
Rule 8.04(a)(3) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct provides. as noted above, that "a 
lawyer shall not.. engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud. deceit or misrepresentation." TEX. 
DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 8.04(a)(3). Decisions interpreting this language have routinely 
required proof of intentional deception; a finding of innocent misrepresenratJOn. or even negligent conduct, 
will not support the conclusion that the rule has been violated. See, e.g, Lerner. 859 S W.2d at 499-500. 
In Lerner, an attorney's misr a 'dling of a settlement check led to charges by the State Bar that she 
had violated the fraud rule. TEX. Sr"TE BAR R. art. XII. § 8, DR 1-102(A)(4) (Tcx Code Profl Resp.), 
34 TEX. BJ. 758 (1971. superseded 1990), the predecessor of Rule 8.04(a)(3). \\hich contained identical 
language, and the rule against conduct adversely reflecting on an attorney's iltness to practice law, TEX. 
STATE BAR R., art XII, Ii 8, DR 1-102(A)(6) (TEX CODE PF0F'L RESP), 34 TEX. BJ. 758 (1971, 
superseded 1990). See id. at 499-500. Although the appellate court found that Lerner did "not contest the 
trial judge's finding[] that she ... [had] misled [opposing counsel] into believing that the .. lawsuit had 
been settled: the court affirmed the trial judge's determination that there \\ as no violation of the fraud 
rule. Id. The appellate court wrote: 
The trial judge obviously believed that Lerner's conduct was wrong. but not that Lerner 
acted dishonestly, fraudulently, or deceitfully, as required by DR I-I 02(A)( 4) Such findings 
would obviously reqUire Intentional misconduct, but Lerner's July 14 letter informed [opposite 
counsel] of all the pertinent facts surrounding her handling of the money and her refusal to 
return the senlement documents. The trial judge could have concluded that this disclosure by 
Lerner was inconsistent with the State Bar's allegations of intentional dishonesty done to 
defraud, deceive, or mislead. 
The allegations that Lerner's conduct adversely reflects upon her fitness to practice law, 
DR 1-102(A)(6), are judged by a different standard. For that conduct, intent is not essentiaL 
Negligent conduct alone may adversely reflect upon an attorney's fitness to practice law. Thus, 
lack of dishonest intent would not necessarily exonerate Lerner from liability for violating DR 
1-102(A)(6) . 
Id. at 499-500 (emphasis added). The above excerpt makes plain that intentional dishonesty is an essential 
element ofa violation of TEX. STATE BAR R, art. XII. § 8, DR 1- I 02(A)(4) (Tex Code Profl Resp.), 34 
TEX. BJ. 758 (1971, superseded 1990), and its identical successor, TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULE PROF'L 
CONDUCT 8.04(a)(3) 
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falsity of the statement), a different outcome may result. 
There is language in Texas ethics codes which suggests that, for purposes 
of discipline, a line is to be drawn between negligence on the one hand and 
recklessness on the other, so that publication of a negligently false statement 
is an insufficient predicate for discipline. whereas recklessness as to falsity 
warrants condemnation. For example, Canon 5(2)(ii) of the Texas Code of 
Judicial Conduct states that "[a] judge or judicial candidate shall not ... 
knowingly or reckless!.v misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present 
position, or other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent."': 
In condemning only knowing or reckless misrepresentation, this 
language suggests that merely negligent falsity cannot be punished as an 
ethical infraction. Expressio unius est e:rciusio alterius. 53 The same innuendo 
flows from the language of Rule 8.02(a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct, \vhich states: 
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with 
reckless disregard as to its truth or fa/sit. concerning the qualifications or 
integrity of a judge, adjudicatory official or public legal officer, or of a 
candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office. q 
In distinguishing between recklessness and negligence, the drafting of 
Canon 5(2)(ii) and Rule 8.02(a) appears to reflect the constitutional precedent 
which has evolved in the field of defamation. Beginning with New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
consistently held that public officials (such as judges) and public figures (such 
as candidates for judicial office) cannot prevail in an action for libel or slander 
without proving "actual malice," meaning knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth.55 "Actual malice" must be established in a defamation 
52. TEX. CODE JUD. CO:\DL'CT, Canon 5(2)(ii) 
53. "[T]he expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 
(6th ed. 1990) 
54. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 8.02(a). 
55. 376 U.S. 254, 284-91 (1964) "Actual malice." a.s defined in ,Yew York Times and subsequent 
cases, is a legal tenn ofan which must be clearly distinguished from "express" or "common law" malice. 
See id. One may utter true statements. just as easily as those which are false, with spite, ill will, 
vindictiveness or motives of revenge-that is to say, with express or common law malice. A showing that 
the defendant was actuated by bad motives is not, by Itself. sulTicient to satisfy the actual malice 
requirement. See id. Proof of ill will says nothing about whether the defendant knew of. or acted 
recklessly as to, the falsity of the defamatory statement 
Jury instructions pennitting a finding of actual malice merely upon proof of hatred, enmity, desire 
to injure, or the like, are constitutionally defective See Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 
81,82 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.s 75, 84 (1966); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 342 (2d 
Cir. 1969); Hinnan v. Rogers, 257 KW.2d 563, 566-67 (Minn. 1977); Polzin v. Helmbrecht, 196 N.W.2d 
685,691 (Wis. 1972). In discussing the reasoning underlying this position, the Supreme Court observed 
in a criminal defamation case: 
[TJhe great principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area 
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action by clear and convincing evidence,56 and it is a highly subjective 
standard: 
[The] cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a 
reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated 
before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the 
conclusion that the defendant in faci enterlained seriOliS doubts as (0 Ihe 
truth ofhis publicalion 57 
The rule on actual malice reflects "a profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp atldcks on government and public officials."58 This 
"profound national commitment" is as relevant to judicial elections as it is to 
other areas of politics. It would therefore be surprising if the constitutional 
principles which the courts have recognized in the field of defamation did not 
have relevance to the imposition of discipline based on statements uttered by 
judicial candidates and judges in the course of a campaign. 
It makes a great difference for disciplinary purposes whether, with 
respect to false statements, recklessness and negligence are lumped together 
or are distinguished from one another. In the former case, a judge or judicial 
candidate could be disciplined merely because the falsity could have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable care. In the latter case, the fact 
preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the kno\\ ing or reckless falsehood. 
Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be 
proved in court that he spoke out of hatred: even if he did speak out (If hatred. utterances 
honestly bdiC\ed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth. 
Under a rule. permitting a finding of [actual] malice based on an intent merely to inflict 
harm. rather than to inflict ham] through falsehood. "it becomes a hazardous matter to speak 
out against a popular politician. with the result that the dishonest and incompetent will be 
shielded." Moreover. "[i]n the case of charges against a popular political figure ... it may be 
almost impossible to show freedom from ill-will or selfish political motives." 
[O]nl: those false statements made with the high degree of ;J\,areness of their 
probable falsity demanded by Sew York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal 
sanctions. [The Constitution protects even] "vehement. caustic. and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public oflkials ,. 
Garrison v. Louisiana. 379 U.S 64.73-75 (1964) (citations omitted) (quoting Dix W. Noel, DefamatIOn 
of Public Officers and Calld/dales. 49 COLL'!. L REV 875.893 (1949). Sew York Times Co, 376 U.S. 
at 270). 
Of course. in many instances. evidence of express malice may be coupled with facts showing that 
the defendant lacked an honest belief in the truth of the statements. In those cases, proof of malice in the 
New York Times sense allows the action to go forward: proof of common-law malice may encourage the 
jury to award a large verdict. 
56. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968) 
57. fd. at 731 (emphasis added) 
58. Sew York Times Co. 376 US. at 270. The Supreme Court has reasoned that "[the] . 
erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and. must be protected if the freedoms of expression 
are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need to survive.'" !d. at 271-72. 
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that the speaker could or should have known of the error is not enough to 
support the imposition of sanctions. 
Is a judge or judicial candidate required to conduct a thorough 
investigation into the facts before saying anything that adversely reflects upon 
an opponent? Such diligence is undoubtedly desirable, for it tends to 
minimize erroneous statements, elevate the tone of public debate, and inspire 
confidence in the electoral process. However, as a matter of constitutional 
law, a judge or judicial candidate probably is not bound to make such an 
inquiry. The precedent vvhich has emerged in the field of news reporting is 
instructive. In disputes raising the issue of whether members of the media 
acted with actual malice (i.e., at least recklessness) in publishing false 
statements, the courts have held that ordinarily the defendant is under no 
obligation to talk to the subject of the defamatory communication to obtain 
that person's version of the events described 59 or to endeavor to present an 
objective picture. ao Moreover, factual inaccuracies alone do not suffice to 
prove actual malice,61 nor is recklessness established merely by showing that 
the reporting in question was speculati\e or even sloppy.6e Indeed, "a public 
figure plaintiff must prove more than an extreme departure from professional 
standards and ... a newspaper's motive in publishing a story-whether to 
promote an opponent's candidacy or to increase its circulation-cannot 
provide a sufficient basis for finding actual malice."6J Even the deliberate 
alteration of quotations will not prove that the publisher acted with knowledge 
of falsity, unless the alteration materially changes the meaning of the 
quotation alleged to be defamatory.64 
Of course, claiming a constitutional right is one thing and proving a 
violation is another. A judge or judicial candidate who is charged with 
misconduct may find the fact-finding process highly invasive. In defamation 
cases, the publisher's state of mind must normally be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence.65 Consequently, in Ill-:dia libel cases, plaintiffs 
routinely seek discovery of information about such matters as 
communications between reporters and editors, facts known but not used in 
a story, the pressures under which the work was prepared, and the identity and 
credibility of the defendant's sources. 66 Presumably, a similar course could 
59. See. e.g, Rosenbloom v Metromedia. Inc. 403 U.S. 29. 56-57 (1971). 
60. See New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567. 576 (5th Cif. 1966). 
61. See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 40 I U.S 279, 292 (1971); Fadell v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 
557 F.2d 107. 109 (7th Cif. 1977) 
62. See Oliver v. Village Voice, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 235, 238 (S.DNY 1976). 
63. Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657. 665 (1989). 
64. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S 496. 517 (1991). 
65. Cj Vincent Robert Johnson, Defamation (Libel and Slander) § 1.02[3][1], in PERSONAL 
INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES (1986) (discussing circumstantial evidence of the editorial 
process). 
66. Cj Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (stating that the First Amendment does not ban 
plaintiffs from inquiring into editorial processes and states of mind of those responsible for publication); 
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be followed by disciplinary authorities if the applicable standard for discipline 
is modeled on the constitutional principles which have emerged in defamation 
cases. 
A prudent candidate in a judicial campaign will stay clear of the line 
distinguishing the impermissible from the protected. Nevertheless, it is 
important to know where the line will be drawn. Although there are some 
occasional expressions suggesting that negligent misrepresentation will 
support the imposition of discipline,67 it is likely that the constitutional 
principles governing libel and slander actions by public officials and public 
figures will continue to set the standard for whether a judge or judicial 
candidate can be disciplined for misrepresenting the identity, qualifications. 
present position, or other facts concerning an opponent.68 
C. Negative Campaigning that Impugns the Integrity oj the Judicial S,vstem 
Can the angry temper or negative tone of campaign statements by itself 
warrant discipline? If a statement is not provably false, can it be challenged 
on the ground that it is unduly vitriolic or contentious? Put differently, are 
judges and judicial candidates obliged to observe an elevated tone of debate 
in the pursuit of an electoral victory? Many writers and courts have suggested 
or taken this approach.69 Thus, the American Bar Association's Code of 
St. Amant. 390 U.S. at 727 (]968) (opining that a statement based wholly on "an unverified anonymous 
telephone call" might be actionable under the actual mal ice standard). 
67. See State v. Russell. 610 P.2d 1122 (Kan. 1980) The Kansas Supreme Court stated that 
"[wJhen derogatory factual allegations are false and with ordinary care should have been known to be false. 
discipline may be imposed." Id. at 1127. However, this endorsement ofa negligence standard was dicta. 
for the court expressly found that the respondent attorne, was "guilty of intentionally puhl ishing known 
falsehoods." 1d. at 1128. Moreover, the l' r: did not address whether :,pniigence should be distinguished 
from recklessness, and at least one of the cases cited by the court for support, State Board of Exam. v 
Spriggs, 155 P2d 285 (Wyo. 1945). predated tk United States Supreme Court's constitutional ization of 
the law of defamation and articulation ofan actual malice standard for public olTicials and public figures. 
See Russell, 610 P2d at 1128 
68. The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct expressly notes that Its provisions are 'rules of reason, 
which should be applied corwstent with constitutional reqUirements." TEX. CODE JCD. CO>"DCCT, Canon 
8(A) 
69. See. e.g., In re Donohoe, 580 P2d 1093 (Wash 1978). The \Vashington Supreme Court 
concluded that, '[ilf running for judicial olTice, a lawyer may criticize an incumbent judge who is his 
opponent but the criticism must be well founded, on a high plane, factual, and not personal." Jd. at 1097 
(citing R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 21 (1966). In the same vein, the old Texas Code of Professional 
Responsibility, which was superseded by the current Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct 
on January 1, 1990, see TEX. STATE BARR., art. XII, § 8 (Tex. Code Profl Resp.), 34 TEX. BJ. 758 (1971, 
superseded 1990), articulated a similar aspirational goal for lawyer criticism of judicial candidates. Also, 
Ethical Consideration 8-6 provided in relevant part: 
Judges and administrative officials having adjudicatory powers ought to be persons of integrity, 
competence, and suitable temperament. Generally, lawyers are qualified, by personal 
observation or investigation, to evaluate the qualifications of persons seeking or being 
considered for such public offices. and for this reason they have a special responsibility to aid 
in the selection of only those who are qualified. . While a lawyer as a citizen has a right to 
1998] ETHICAL CAMPAIGNING FOR THE JUDICICARY 825 
Judicial Conduct cautions in mandatory terms that "a candidate for a judicial 
office: ... shall maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office. "70 In a 
recent case, which is illustrative, the New York Commission on Judicial 
Conduct wrote in imposing discipline: 
Even in his or her own campaign, a judge faces constraints. A judicial 
candidate must "maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office" .... 
Even in the face of provocation by an opponent, a judge must adhere to this 
standard. Respondent's political advertisements, suggesting that his opponent 
would be biased as a judge and was not respected in his profession and 
comparing him to comic characters. lacked the dignity required of judicial 
candidates. 71 
It is easy to posit examples of negative campaigning. Consider, for 
instance, whether it would be permissible for a judicial candidate for the 
Texas Supreme Court to make statements like those quoted at the beginning 
of this article, painting the incumbents as the judicial equivalent of pestilence, 
death, and famine or as "captive pets" of the insurance industry7" Or take the 
recent case where a judicial candidate labeled the incumbent a "judicial 
reactionary" and accused him of having a " 'campaign treasury heavily laden 
with lavish contributions by politically influential lawyers and lobbyists, 
power brokers for liability risk insurance companies, finances, environmental 
polluters and a heavy handed law enforcement establishment of this 
community.' ,,73 Of course, harsh statements make for easy cases. But there 
are also mild forms of negative campaigning, such as those contained in a 
recent fund-raising letter which said only that the candidate was running "to 
restore fairness, respect and experience" to the bench and urged voters to "give 
justice a chance.,,74 Even if such statements can be labeled "negative," how 
they should be dealt with as a matter of judicial ethics is far from clear. 
criticize such otTicials publicly, he should be certain of the merit of his complaint, use 
appropriate language, and avoid petty criticism, for unrestrained and intemperate statements 
tend to lessen public confidence in our legal svstem. Criticisms motivated by reasons other 
than a desire to improve the legal system are not justified. 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-6 (1980) 
70. MODEL CODE OF Jl'DIClAL CONDl'CT Canon 5(A)(3)(a) (1990). rhe Texas Code of Judicial 
Conduct contains no parallel language. 
71. N.Y. COM. JLD. CO~D., Jan. 27, 1994. avaIlable in 1994 WL 897478 
72. See Elder, supra note I, at 2. 
73. in re Hopewell. 507 N.W.2d 911,913-14 (SO 1993). The court suspended the attorney-
candidate from practice based in part on its finding that the quoted statements violated provisions of the 
state code of judicial conduct requiring a judge or judicial candidate to promote confidence in the 
judiciary. See id. at 914-15,918. The court noted, however, that the attorney had abandoned his initial 
plan to defend his conduct on the ground that it was protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of free 
speech and that, therefore, the court did not address that issue. See id. at 917 n.ll. 
74. This language appeared in a fund-raising letter used in San Antonio in fall of 1997. A copy 
is on file with the author of this article. 
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The most relevant provision in the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct 
would appear to be Canon 2(A): "A judge shall comply with the law and 
should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."75 
Although the text of Canon 2(A) imposes this obligation of promoting 
public confidence only on judges, the same requirements are made applicable 
by other provisions of the code to "[a]ny person seeking elective judicial 
office."76 It might reasonably be argued that negative campaigning by a judge 
or judicial candidate diminishes "public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary" and, therefore, such statements run afoul of 
Canon 2(A). 
However. it is open to question whether a rule that judicial campaign 
speech must promote public confidence in the judiciary could survive 
constitutional scrutiny. The United States Supreme Court has never directly 
ruled on the issue. 
In the field of lawyer advertising, disciplinary authorities at one time 
insisted that communications by lawyers about their availability or services 
had to be restrained and dignified. 77 It is now clear that the constitutionality 
of restrictions on commercial speech by attorneys turns not on whether the ad 
is tasteful, but whether it is false or misleading. Thus, in Zauderer v. Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel, the Supreme Court rejected a rule which, for the 
purpose of ensuring that attorneys advertised "in a dignified manner," 
restricted the use of illustrations. 78 The Court wrote: 
[W]e are unsure that the State's desire that attorneys maintain their dignity 
in their communications with the public is an interest substantial enough to 
justify the abridgment of their First Amendment rights. Even if that were the 
case, we are unpersuaded that undignified behavior would tend to recur so 
often as to warrant a prophylactic rule .... [T]he mere possibility that some 
members of the population might find advertising embarrassing or offensive 
cannot justify suppressing it. The same must hold true for advertising that 
some members of the bar might find beneath their dignity.7" 
At least one other court has taken a similar approach in a case involving an 
attorney's campaign for a non-judicial office. In Slate v. Russell, the court 
observed that publishing statements which do not appear to be in good taste 
and which are largely political rhetoric cannot be the basis for imposing 
75. TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT. Canon 2(A) 
76. Jd. Canon 6(G)(l). 
77. See Vincent R. Johnson. Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners and 
Associates.' Tori, Fiduciary, and DiSCiplinary Liability. 50 U. PITT. L REV 1,23-25 (1988) (discussing 
the rules once applicable to the announcement of a lawyer's move from one firm to another). 
78. 471 U.S 626,648 (1985) 
79. Jd 
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discipline against an attorney.80 
Howeyer, other courts have focused on the impact that judicial campaign 
language has on the administration of justice. They have reasoned, in effect, 
that lawyers and judges have special obligations because of their professional 
status, and that important state interests justify according them a dim inished 
scope for free expression,81 even in the context of a political race. For 
example, in In re Riley, the Supreme Court of Arizona wrote in J 984: 
Even if not a candidate for judicial office, a lawyer is held to a narrower 
standard of free speech than a non-lawyer when discussing the judiciary: 
A layman may, perhaps, pursue his theories of free speech or 
political activities until he runs afoul of the penalties of libel or 
slander, or into some infraction of our statutory law. A member 
of the bar can, and will, be stopped at the point where he infringes 
our Canon of Ethics; and if he wishes to remain a member of the 
bar he will conduct himself in accordance therewith. 
A lawyer may be disciplined if his public comments threaten a significant 
state interest. The good standing of the judicial system is such a significant 
interest. Generally, and also during a judicial campaign, a lawyer may 
accurately critici:::e a sitting judge, but may not impugn the integrity of the 
judicial system or question the decisions of the judge. 82 
Elaborating on this view, the court stated: 
Freedom of speech does allow fair comment even by a lawyer 
candidate concerning a judge opponent: 
A candidate for non judicial office is free to announce his stand 
on the issues he must pass upon in office, and to pledge his vote 
on those issues; the judicial candidate is forbidden to enter this 
customary campaign arena. Hence, un less the election is to be a 
pure popularity contest based on name recogr.ition alone, the only 
legitimate area for debate is the relative quai"ications of the 
candidates. In our view, the health, work habits, experience and 
ability of the candidates are all matters of legitimate concern to 
the electorate who must make the chole'e. 
We believe Ihat candidates for judicial ojJice her"e a First Amendmel1l 
right to critici:::e an incumbent judge for such mailers as intemperate 
80. 610 P.2d 1122. 1127 (Kan. 1980). 
81. See In re Schenk, 870 P.2d 185,203-05 (Or. 1994). In Schenk, ajudge wrote a letter to the 
local paper and a "guest editorial" which criticized the district attorney for actions in a case that was tried 
before the judge. See id. at 200. In suspending the judge for 45 days without pay, the Oregon Supreme 
Court held that the judge's comments did not preserve or promote public confidence in the judiciary or 
in its impartiality and that those interests outweighed the judge's interests in speaking out on a matter of 
public concern. See id. at 204-05. 
82. 691 P.2d 695.703 (Ariz. 1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Woodward, 
300 S.w.2d 385, 393-94 (Mo 1957)) 
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behavior, injudicious actions, lack of judicial temperament, unpredictability, 
and unnecessary delay in rendering decisions. We are aware that the line 
between fair comment and impemlissible comment is indistinct and also that 
judges are relatively helpless to defend themselves from such attacks. 
Nevertheless, in jurisdictions that require the election of judges, such 
comment must be allowed. 
Lawyers who are candidates for judicial office may not impugn the 
integrity of the judicial system or question the decisions of the judge. 
Lawyers may make fair comment on the judge's jilness so long as Iht' 
comment does not call into question decisions of Ihe courl or question Ihc 
integrity of the judicial s:vstem. For example, a lawyer may criticize a judge 
for unnecessary delay in reaching a decision, but may not question the 
decision itself except on appeal. This is not to say, however, that a lawyer 
may not publicly disagree with a judge's decision. Proper avenues for 
questioning a decision include the appellate route and disciplinary 
proceedings where appropriate. What we condemn is conduct v,:hich 
denigrates the judicial system as a whole and undennines the public's 
confidence in it. S) 
It can hardly be disputed that there is an important state interest in 
maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice,84 Many cases 
have relied upon that interest in holding that attorneys enjoy diminished free 
speech rights when acting as advocates in the course of litigation,85 The 
83. Id. at 704 (cita.i ns omitted) (emphasis added). 
84. A state's interest in maintaining confidence in the.judiclal 5> stem is undoubtedly related to 
its interest in maintaining confidence in the legal profession. In Florida Bar ,. Went/or li. Inc., 5 I 5 US 
618 (1995), rules prohibiting personal injury lawyers from sending targeted di".t-maii solicitations to 
victims and their relatives for 30 days following an accident or disaster were upheld in part because the 
Court found that the Bar had a substantial interest in prc ',enting the erosion of confidence in the kgal 
profession that such invasions were found to have engendered. See Id. at 625-28. It is difficult to predict 
what significance, if any, Went For it may have with regard to restrictions on speech incident to Judicial 
campaigns. The rules at issue in Went for it were limitations on commerclQl speech by attorneys, which 
is a fonn of expression that enjoys only diminished First Amendment protection. See Id. at 622. A 
restriction on commercial speech that does not concern unlawful activity and is not misleading is 
pennissible if the government: (I) asserts a substantial interest in support of its regulation: (2) establ ishcs 
that the restriction directly and materially advances that interest; and (3) demonstrates that the regulation 
is "narrowly drawn." fd. at 623-24 (citing Central Hudson Gas & EJec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 
U.S. 557, 564-65 (1980)). In contrast. speech incidental to judicial campaigns is poiltlcal speech, and 
therefore entitled to a higher degree of constitutional protection. See Robert H. Bork, .\'eulral Principles 
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47IND LJ. 1,29 (1971). 
85. See Gentile V. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991) (holding that a state may limit out-of-
court statements by attorneys about pending proceedings); Kentucky Bar Ass 'n v. Waller, 929 S W.2d 181, 
183 (Ky, 1996) (suspending an attorney for stating in a motion that a judge was a "lying incompetent ass-
hole"), cerl. denied, I 17 S. Ct. 949 (1997). In Waller, the court wrote: 
Respondent appears to believe that truth or some concept akin to truth, such as accuracy or 
correctness, is ,I defense to the charge against him. In this respect he has totally missed the 
point. There can never be a justification for a lawyer to use such scurrilous language with 
respect to a judge in pleadings or in open court. The reason is not that the judge is of such 
delicate sensibilities as to be unable to withstand the comment, but rather that such language 
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question, however, is whether the state interest in maintaining public 
confidence in the courts is sufficient to restrict attorney speech outside the 
courtroom when no litigation is pending and there is no serious risk of 
prejudice to an ongoing proceeding. Some scholars answer that question in 
the negative. For example, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky is of the view that 
"[c]onfidence in government should never be gained by silencing speech"86 
and that the speech rights of judges "only should be infringed if there is a 
compellingjustification."87 As a general rule, restrictions on political speech 
are upheld only in the most limited circumstances,88 such as where, under the 
test in Brandenberg v. Ohio, the speech is "directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and ... likely to incite or produce such action."89 
Aside from questions of constitutionality, the distinction proposed in 
Riley-between speech which criticizes ajudge's actions or qualifications, on 
the one hand, and speech which criticizes decisions of the judge and the 
integrity of the judicial system, on the other hand90-can be challenged on the 
ground that it is unworkable in practice. Is it possible to impugn a judge's 
actions or qualifications without adversely reflecting upon the judge's 
decisions? Doesn't revelation of the fact that ajudge is incompetent, lazy, or 
corrupt necessarily cast a dark shadow on the integrity of the judicial process? 
It can be plausibly argued that the ruling in Riley renders the First Amendment 
rights of judicial candidates illusory by providing that they can criticize a 
sitting judge only if the statements about the judge do not undermine 
confidence in the judicial system.91 
In Riley, the candidate in question (who was successful in winning a 
judgeship) had criticized the incumbent judge by telling reporters that a 
contempt order was "crazy," "absolutely insane," and "motivated by revenge 
on the part of [the incumbent]," stating that the incumbent was "vindictive" 
and "partial," and alleging that the "state simply doesn't get a fair trial in his 
court."n The court found that these comments, and "particularly the statement 
that '[t]he state simply doesn't get a fair trial in his court,' questioned the 
promotes disrespect forth~ law and for the judicial system. Ot1lcers of the court are obi igated 
to uphold the dignity of the Court of Justice and. at a minimum. this requires them to refrain 
Irom conduct of the type at issue here. 
Waller. 929 S.W.2d at 183. See generally WE Shipley. Annotation. AI/orne)"s Cntlclsm of JudlclOl Acts 
as Ground of Disciplinary Action. 12 A.LR.3d 1408, 1418-27 (1967) 
86. Erwin Chemerinsky. In Defense of Speech. Judges and fhe First Amendment, 4 The Long 
Term View 78, 81 (1997) 
87. fd. at 79. 
88. See Bork, supra note 84, at 29 (stating that the "core of the first amendment" is "speech that 
is explicitly political," which includes "criticisms of public officials and policies" and "speech addressed 
to the conduct of any governmental unit in the country"). 
89. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
90. See In re Riley, 691 P2d 695, 704 (Ariz. 1984). 
91. See id. 
92. Id. at 703-04. 
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decisions of the court and the administration of justice."93 The candidate's 
actions, the court ruled, constituted "conduct prejudicial to the administration 
of justice,"94 and therefore discipline in the form of public censure was 
imposed.95 In dissent, the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court noted 
the impracticality of the standard articulated by the majority, observing that 
"[ 0 ]ften the only way the deficiencies or prejudices of a judge can be shown 
is by referring to specific cases or categories of cases decided by that judge."96 
93. Id at 704. 
94. Id. Disciplinary Ruk 1·102(A)(5) of the Arizona ethics c\)dc prohibits an attorney from 
engaging in "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.' Id. That same language \\as contained 
in the old Texas Code of Professional Responsibility. TEX. STATE B.·\R R .. art. XII. ~ 8. (Tex Code prorl 
Resp.). 34 TEX. BJ. 758 :1971. superseded 1990), which was replaced D: the current Texas Disciplinary 
Rules of Professional Conduct on January l. 1990. See TEX. DISCIPLI'.;,\RY R. PROF'L CO'.;DLCT. r<'pnmed 
,II TEX. GOV'T CODE AJ'..'N. tit. 2. subtit. G app. A (Vernon SUpp. 19lJ8) (TEX STATE B-\R R. art. X, 9 9): 
Robert P. Schuwerk and John F. Sutton. Jr.. A GUide 10 the Texas DlsCipimary Rules of ProfessIOnal 
Conduct. 27A HOL. L REv. 1.468 (1990) (discussing TEX. STATE BAR R. art. XII. ~8. DR 1·102(.·\)(5) 
(Tex. Code Prof! Resp.), 34 TEX B.1. 758 (197!. superseded 1'!9U)) The Texas Rules do not carr: 
forward the "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice' language. but instead have replaced it 
with a ver:' different standard which prohibits attorneys from engaging in c(1nduet "constituting obstructiun 
of justice.' The "obstruction of justice' standard is "substantially narrower' than the "prejudicial to the 
administration of justiCe" rule. and it is doubtful that the language at issue in Riley could be found to 
violate the new Texas formulation. "The drafters did not intend thi;, new standard to be triggered by 
conduct significantly less egregious than that involved in the federal criminal offense of obstruction of 
justice or its state counterparts.' Schuwerk & Sutton, supra at 475. It is therefore interesting to speculate 
what provision of the Texas Rules or the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, if any, a Texas court could rely 
upon if it were inclined to embrace a position similar to the one taken by the Arizona Supreme Court in 
Riley. As noted above in the text, Canon 2(A) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] 
judge shall comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence 
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary" TEX. CODE JuD. CO:\Dl·CT. Canon 2(A). Canon 6(G)(3) 
of the judicial code further provides that "[a]ny lawyer who is a candidate seeking judicial of1ice who 
violates Canon 5 or other relevant provisions of this Code is subject to disciplinary action by the State Bar 
ofTexas." Id, Canon 6(G)(3) 
It seems reasonable that a judge who makes statements during a c:lm[laign impugning the integrit: 
of the judicial system could be disciplined by the Commission on Judicial Conduct for violating Canon 
2(A) and that a lawyer guilty of the same conduct could be disciplined by the State Bar because Canon 
2(A) is an "other relevant provision.' \\ ithin the meaning of Canon 6( (i)(3) Of course. whether such 
action would survive review under the First Amendment is presently unresolved. 
95. See Riley, 691 P2d at 704-05. Interestingly, the court also CrIticized the candidate for having 
publicly revealed that the incumbent judge had engaged in improper ex pane communication The c:oun 
wrote: 
Any grievance a lawyer may have concerning ethical misconduct b) a sitting judge should be 
submitted to the Commission on JudiCial Qualifications. "Going [lublic' by a member of the 
Bar is not the appropriate method to redress misconduct by a Judge. As the South Dakota 
Supreme Court has noted: "That respondent sought instead to voice his complaints in precisel) 
the manner and forum that would most likely cast doubt upon the competence and integrity of 
the member of the judiciary without the slightest possibility that any constructive. remedial 
actions would result from those remarks belies respondent's assertions that he made the 
statement in good faith and in the spirit of constructive criticism." 
Id. at 705 (quoting In re Lacey. 283 N.W.2d 250, 252 (SO. 1979)) 
96. Id at 709·10 (Holohan, CJ., dissenting). The Chief Justice further wrote: 
If the court's opinion had limited itself to statements by the lawyer candidate which were false. 
misleading. or concerning pending litigation. I could have joined in that portion of the opinion. 
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In other contexts, similar notes have sounded. For example, in Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals. Inc. v. Havner, "much of [a] ... motion for rehearing [was] 
an intemperate attack on the members" of the Texas Supreme Court. 97 In 
dissenting from an order of referral, Justice Rose Specter argued that the 
writing could not possibly "form the basis for lawyer discipline," noting that: 
[M]ore than fifty years ago Justice [Hugo] Black recognized (in the context 
of a contempt proceeding for statements published in a newspaper) that 
attempts to stifle criticism of judges and our courts may, in fact, be 
counterproductive: 
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by 
shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the 
character of American public opinion. For it is a prized American 
privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect 
good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, 
however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of 
the bench, would probably engender resentment. suspicion, and 
contempt much more than it would enhance respect 98 
The holding that a lawyer as a candidate for judge may not cnticize the decisions of a sitting 
judge, however, is neither in hannony with the First Amendment nor with the necessities of a 
free soc iety. 
Judges are not unique in the realm ofpublic officeholders. The record books regretfully 
show that some have been dishonest, incompetent, and prejudiced .. A ruling that a lawyer as 
a candidate for the judiciary cannot bring such facts to the public notice, if such be the facts, 
is a threat to our constitutional system. 
Under the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution, we must begin with the proposition 
that "[I)ike other citizens. attorneys are entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment, 
even as participants in the administration of justice." A rev iew of the cases in which attorneys 
were disciplined for campaign comments directed at an incUlrhent judge strongly suggests that, 
absent misrepresentation, courts should be most reluctant tll Impose discipline upon an attorney 
for comments during ajudicial campaign except in egregious ~Ircumstances where a candidate 
seriously denigrates the judicial system, impugns the reputation of an incumbent judge, or in 
any way interferes with an ongoing proceedincc Campaign criticism of an incumbent 
judge's decisions, voting record. courtroom demeanor. or \\ork habits, however. should be 
considered fair commen!. 
While misstatement of fact by an attorney universally warrants sanction, the law is 
equally clear that an attorney may criticize the legal decishJfls of a judge without sanction, so 
long as these comments do not interfere with ongoing proceedings 
The broad general statements in the majority opinion serve to stille honest and truthful 
discussion about the decisions of a judge or court. As I read the majority opinion, a lawyer 
may appeal a case. but the law'! er may never comment atter the case is tinally resolved that the 
case made bad law, poor policy. or resulted in an injustice. Such a position is not only contrary 
to the Constitution, but it also deprives the public of necessary information to make an 
informed decision about the performance of their judges. 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 489 (~J 1982» 
97. 956 S.W.2d 532. 532 (Specter, 1.. dissenting). 
98. Id. (Specter, 1. dissenting) (citing Bridges v. California. 314 U.S 252,270·71 (1941»; see 
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The constitutional uncertainty of restrictions on negative campaigning 
strongly suggest that judges and judicial candidates must chart a cautious 
course unless they wish to become embroiled in disciplinary proceedings. 
Indeed, even if such limitations on political speech during the course of a 
judicial campaign run afoul of the First Amendment, such statements should 
be avoided, if for no other reason than that they place the speaker in a bad 
light if there is a debate over the truth or falsity of the charges made by the 
speaker. That is, the negativity or tastelessness of a statement made during a 
judicial campaign may be taken into account by a fact finder in determining 
whether the speaker acted with knowledge that the statement was false. or 
with reckless disregard for the truth, and is therefore subject to discipline on 
that independent ground. 
D. Statements About Justiciable issues 
For better or worse,99 the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits 
judges and judicial candidates from expressing opinions "on any issue that 
may be subject to judicial interpretation by the office \vhich is being sought 
or held."loo This general rule is subject to a qualification which permits 
discussion of a judge or candidate's "judicial philosophy," provided that 
discussion would "not suggest to a reasonable person a probable decision on 
any particular case."IOI The effect of these rules may be that judges are 
protected from being forced to publicly commit to positions on issues they 
have not fully considered and citizens are not compelled to litigate their 
controversies before judges who have prejudged those matters. On the other 
also Keith C. Livesay, Letter to the Editor, TEX. LAWYER. Dec. 8, 1997. at 36 ("If the justices expect 
decorum and respect, they must not only accept the truth, they must ad in a manner which merits it by 
writing intellectually honest and consistent opinions. "). 
99. See Steven LubeL Judicial Conduct. Speech and Consequences, 4 Ine Long Term View 71 
(1997) (arguing that judging generally benefits from privacy and that too much public speaking may 
debase the process of judging, taking it out of the contemplative solitude of chambers and into the messy, 
disputatious civic square). 
100. TEX. CODE JUD. COC;Dl'CT. Canon 5( I) (emphasis added) Une occasionally hears surprising, 
ifnot bizarre, reports ofa candidate for a civil court judgeship publlclv declaring to be in favor of the 
death penalty, even though the court to which the candidate aspires has nothing to do with criminal cases 
or the imposition of capital punishment Presumably, such conduct \\ould not violate Canon 5( I) since 
the prohibition against the expression ofan opinion applies only if the opinion involves an "issue that may 
be subject to judicial interpretation by the office which is being sought." Jd. Further, in such 
circumsLances, the candidate's statements about the desirability of the death penalty might be regarded as 
merely reflective of his or her judicial philosophy. and for that reason permissible under the exception to 
the general rule discussed above in the text. Nevertheless. deliberate deception of electorate is a serious 
matter. On appropriate facts, it might be argued that an attempt to curry support by misleading voters into 
believing that the office in question has some power over the imposition of capital punishment is conduct 
involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation," and therefore punishable under Rule 8.04(a)(3) 
of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L COC;DUCT 
8.04(a)(3). 
101. TEX CODE JUD. CONDVCT, Canon 5( I). 
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hand, the effect may be that the public is relegated to vapid campaign rhetoric 
and deprived of the information they would most like to have in order to cast 
informed ballots. It would be possible to frame a rule narrower than the 
current Texas provisions regulating discussion of judiciable issues that would 
protect most, if not all, of the relevant interests. Such a rule might, for 
example, prohibit a judge or judicial candidate from discussing issues in a 
manner that would indicate a probable decision in any particular case. 
However, that and other alternative paths have not been taken in Texas, and 
the existing prohibition of issue discussion must be understood as broad. 
"There is almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come before a 
judge of an American court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction." 102 
Some courts have found that language similar to that found in the Texas 
code was so broadly drawn as to be unconstitutional. IO) For example in 
Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, the Seventh Circuit invalidated a 
rule which provided that: 
[A judge or judicial candidate] [s]hould not make pledges or promises of 
conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the 
duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues 
... ; provided, however, that he may announce his views on measures to 
improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, if, in 
doing so, he does not cast doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any 
issue that may come before him.l04 
Finding the rule unconstitutional, Judge Richard Posner wrote for the court: 
Two principles are in conflict and must, to the extent possible, be reconciled. 
Candidates for public office should be free to express their views on all 
matters of interest to the electorate. Judges should decide cases in 
accordance with law rather than with any express or implied commitments 
that they may have made to their campaign supporters or to others ... 
[O]nly a fanatic would suppose that one of the princip~ 's should give way 
completely to the other-that the principle of freedom of speech should be 
held to entitle a candidate for judicial office to promise to vote for one side 
or another in a particular case or class of cases or that the principle of 
impartial legal justice should be held to prevent a candidate for such office 
from furnishing any information or opinion to the electorate beyond his 
name, rank, and serial number. ... 
. . . [T]he concern which animates the rule is precisely that a candidate 
102, Buckley y, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd" 997 F,2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993), 
!O3, See j,C,J.D, v, RJ,C.R" 803 S,W,2d 953, 955 (Ky, 1991) (invalidating on constitutional 
grounds a rule which barred judges and judicial candidates from announcing views on disputed legal or 
political issues), But see Strenon v, Disciplinary Bd" 944 F.2d 137, 146 (3rd Cir, 1991) (upholding a rule 
that was almost identical to the one at issue in Buckley, which is discussed below in the text), 
104, 997 F,2d at 225, 
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in a judicial election might, in order to attract votes or to rally his supporters, 
make commitments to decide particular cases or types of case in a particular 
way and having made such a commitment would be under pressure to honor 
it if he won the election and such a case later came before him. This 
commitment, this pressure, would hamper the judge's ability to make an 
impartial decision and would undermine the credibility of his decision to the 
losing litigant and to the community. The difficulty with crafting a rule to 
prevent the making of such commitments is that a commitment can be 
implicit as well as explicit. And this in two ways. The candidate might 
make an explicit commitment to do something that was not, in so many 
words, taking sides in a particular case or class of cases but would be so 
understood by the electorate; he might for example promise always to give 
paramount weight to public safety or to a woman's right of privacy. Or he 
might discuss a particular case or class of cases in a way that was understood 
as a commitment to rule in a particular way, even though he avoided the 
language of pledges, promises, or commitments. 
The rule here challenged deals with both forms of implied commitment 
and in the most comprehensive fashion imaginable. The "pledges or 
promises" clause is not limited to pledges or promises to rule a particular way 
in particular cases or classes of case; all pledges and promises are forbidden 
except a promise that the candidate will if elected faithfully and impartially 
discharge the duties of his judicial office. The "announce" clause is not 
limited to declarations as to how the candidate intends to rule in particular 
cases or classes of case; he may not "announce his views on disputed legal 
or political issues," period. The rule certainly deals effectively with the 
abuse that the draftsmen were concerned with; but in so doing it gags the 
judicial candidate. He can say nothing in public about his judicial 
philosophy; he cannot, for example, pledge himself to be a strict 
constructionist, or for that matter a legal realist. He cannot promise a better 
shake for indigent litigants or harried employers. He cannot criticize Roe v. 
Wade. He cannot express his views about substantive due process, economic 
rights. search and seizure, the war on drugs, the use of excessive force by 
police, the conditions of the prisons, or products liability-or for that matter 
about laissez-faire economics, race relations, the civil war in Yugoslavia, or 
the proper direction of health-care reform. . .. A II these are disputed legal 
or political issues. 
The rule thus reaches far beyond speech that could reasonably be 
interpreted as committing the candidate in a way that would compromise his 
impartiality should he be successful in the election. Indeed, the only safe 
response to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 67(B)( 1 )(c) is silence .... 
. . . [T]he principle of impartial justice under law is strong enough to 
entitle government to restrict the freedom of speech of participants in the 
judicial process, including candidates for judicial office, but not so strong as 
to place that process completely outside the scope of the constitutional 
guaranty of freedom of speech. Beyond that valuable generality the cases do 
not provide much guidance, but they certainly do not support the proposition 
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that to prevent the slightest danger of judicial candidates' making statements 
that might be interpreted as commitments a state is free to circumscribe their 
freedom of speech by a rule so sweeping that only complete silence would 
comply with a literal, which is also so far as appears the intended and the 
reasonable interpretation of the rule. 105 
835 
The constitutionality of the Texas rule has not been squarely addressed. 
However, there is authority in Texas that it is impermissible for a judge or 
judicial candidate to advertise or state a position on abortion. such as 
declaring to be a pro-choice or pro-life candidate 106 Such conduct would 
violate the rule on discussion of issues subject to judicial interpretation and 
might also violate Canon 5(2)(1) because it carries a "strong impl ication of a 
promise of particular conduct in office other than the faithful performance of 
official duties."Io7 
One recent San Antonio judicial campaign ad touted the candidate as 
being "Tough-As-Nails. TOllgh-on-Crime."1~8 and another ad. for a different 
judge, announced "Respect for the Victim. Tough Justice for the Criminal."J09 
Such rhetoric is undoubtedly a consequence of America's never ending "war 
on crime." Presumably, the proponents of such advertising take the position 
that this kind of advertising is merely reflective of the candidate' s "judicial 
philosophy" and would "not suggest to a reasonable person a probable 
decision on any particular case."IIO That is a legitimate position. But it is also 
a risky one. Judges and judicial candidates in other states have been 
disciplined for making similar statements, such as "tough on drunk driving,"III 
"solid reputation for law and order,"II2 and "does not allow plea bargaining."113 
"The general sense of ... [those out of state] opinions is that anything that 
could be interpreted as a pledge that the candidate will take a particular 
approach in deciding cases or a particular class of cases is prohibited."'14 
The severe limitations imposed in the discussion of justiciable issues 
means that a judge or judicial candidate should exercise great care in 
responding to a questionnaire submitted by a nrivate group seeking 
105. id. at 227-31. 
106. Comm. onJud. Ethics. State Bar of Tex .. Op. I~':\ I I C)'!)). repnnl<!d In 67 TEX ltD COL'c;CIL 
& OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JL'D. SyS ",;". REP. 76 (1995) 
107. id. 
108. Ad on file with the Texas Tech Law Revie\\ 
109. Ad on file with the Texas Tech Law Revic\\ 
110. TEX. COD. JUD. CO';DLCT. Canon 5( I) 
Ill. In re Kaiser, 759 P2d 392. 39.:\-96 (Wash 1988) (censuring an incumbent judge). 
112. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 27. at 372 (citing in rc Nolan. a 198.:\ Unreported Order of the 
Kentucky Commission on Judicial Conduct that censured a Kentucky judge for making improper remarks 
and distributing improper campaign materials during a reelection campaign) 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
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information about the judge's views.1I5 It is permissible for the judge or 
candidate to submit answers which communicate the judge's judicial 
philosophy, but only if those answers do not represent an expression of 
opinion on "any issue that may be subject to judicial interpretatio;; by the 
office which is being sought or held"116 or, as discussed below, an opinion on 
cases previously decided by a court on which the judge sat. lI7 
E. True Information 
As the discussion above may suggest, dissemination of the truth 
generally enjoys a high degree of constitutional protection. Thus, it is 
permissible for a judge who is running for judicial office to use the title 
"judge" in political advertising and in the name of the campaign committee, 
on campaign literature and stationery, in press releases. and in newspaper 
articles. 118 Political literature may also accurately describe the judge's judicial 
experience. I 19 This is true even if the judge is running for non-judicial 
office. 120 Likewise, a judge or judicial candidate may accurately list in 
political advertising the fact that he or she has been endorsed by special 
interest groups, such as Texans Against Drunk Driving, Texans for Tort 
Reform, Texas Prosecutors Association, Texas Peace Officers Association, 
Texans for Law Enforcement, Pro-Life Texans, or Texans for Choice. 121 Even 
though such groups may have strong political agendas, the mere listing of 
their endorsement, by itself, does not violate the rule against expressing an 
opinion on an area subject to judicial interpretation. 122 
Of course, even accurate information may be presented in a way that is 
misleading or otherwise objectionable. Thus, a judge may not use in his 
115. See id. at 373. "Most advisory opinions addressing the use Df questionnaires in judicial 
campaigns strongly disapprove of the practice." /d. 
116. TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5(1) (emphasis added) 
117. See discussion irifra Part llLG. 
118. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 164 (1993), reprinted in 65 TEX. JUD. 
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JGD. SYS. ANN. REp. 133 (l993) A difTerent rule applies when the 
judge is running for a non-judicial political office. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics. State Bar ofTex, Op. 159 
(1993), reprinted in 65 TEX. JUD. COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. S1'5. ANN. REP. 131 (1993). The 
use of the title "Judge" in that connection would violate the rule against lending the prestige of judicial 
office to the advancement of private interest. See TEX. CODE JUD. CONDlCT. Canon 2(B). Thus, a sitting 
judge cannot state in a political advertisement, "Elect Judge to Congress." See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State 
Bar of Tex., Op. 159 (1993). In addition, a sitting judge who runs for a non-judicial political office cannot 
use the title "Judge" in the name of the campaign committee. See id. 
119. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 165 (1993), reprinted in TEX. JUD. COUNCIL 
& OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEx. JUD. SYS. ANN. REp. 133 (1993) 
120. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 159 (1993). "The judge must be cautious 
not to give undue emphasis to his or her present uudicial] position so as to give the impression he or she 
is attempting to exploit his or her judicial office." Id. 
121. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 184 (l995), reprinted in 67 TEX. JUD. 
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. SyS. ANN. REp. 76 (1995). 
122. See id. 
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campaign advertising confidential anonymous comments written by other 
judges who attended a class that was taught by the judge. 123 To present those 
comments as reflective of what other judges think about the judge as a 
candidate running for office would "violate the trust in which they were 
given," tend to mislead the reader because the judges who filled out the 
evaluations mayor may not be supportive of the candidate. and indirectly lend 
the prestige of judicial office to the advancement of private interests, in 
violation of Canon 2(8).124 
F. Comments About Pending and Impending Cases 
A judge is prohibited from publicly discussing the merits of cases that 
are, or may come. before the judge's court. 125 Similar restrictions apply to 
statements by a judicial candidate. 12b The key provision is Canon 3(B)(l 0), 
which provides: 
A judge shall abstain from public commc:nt about a pending or impending 
proceeding which may come before the judge's court in a manner which 
suggests to a reasonable person the Judge' s probable decision on any 
particular case. The judge shall require similar abstention on the part of 
court personnel subject to the judge's direction and control. This section 
does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the course of their 
official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of 
the court. This section does not apply to proceedings in which the judge is 
a litigant in a personal capacity. 127 
As drafted, the rule effectively distinguishes between statements about the 
merits of a case, on the one hand, and mere procedural matters. on the other 
hand. 128 The public discussion of procedural matters-such as whether jurors 
will be sequestered or \vhether a losing party has a right to appeal-serves to 
educate the citizenry about the operation of the legal system and poses little 
or no risk to the adjudicatory process. Accordll1gly, there is no prohibition 
123. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics. State Bar of Tex .. Op 168 (1994). reprinted In TEX. 1L.'D. COU",CIL 
& OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. Jl·D. S YS. AN?-o:. REP. 125 ( 19Q.j) 
124. Jd. 
125. See TEX. CODE JeD CO:--:DlCT. Canon 3(B)( I 0) 
126. See id .. Canon 5(3). This conclusion finds support in the language of Canon 5(3). which states 
in relevant part that a "judicial candidate may. express his or her views on political matters in accord 
with ... Canon 3(B)(I 0)." the canon which restricts statements by Judges about pending or impending 
cases. Jd. 
127. Id., Canon 3(B)(10). The last sentence of Canon 3(B)(10) is odd and perhaps unnecessary. 
Cj id., Canon 3(8)( 1) (" A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which 
disqualification is required or recusal is appropriate."). If the dispute was one in which the judge was a 
litigant in a personal capacity. the judge would be disqualified from hearing the case. and therefore the 
matter could not "come before the Judge's court." Id 
128. See id. Canon 3(B)( 10) 
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against such statements. 
In contrast, comments about the merits of a case may jeopardize the 
litigation process in any of several ways. Such statements may prematurely 
commit the judge to a position before all evidence has been presented or they 
may be animated more by a desire to please the public audience than by a 
commitment to render an impartial decision. For these and other reasons, 
statements about the merits of pending or impending cases, just like 
expressions of opinion on other issues subject to judicial interpretation, are 
broadly condemned. 129 
Interestingly, the Code of Judicial Conduct expressly states that a lawyer 
who contributes to a judge or judicial candidate's violation of Canon 3(B)( 10) 
is subject to disciplinar~' action by the State Bar of Texas. 130 In so stating, the 
judicial code is partially duplicative of a broader standard contained in Rule 
8.04(a)(6) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
provides that "A lawyer shall not ... knowingly assist a judge or judicial 
officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct."131 
However, the express reference to the impermissibility of a lawyer's aiding 
ajudge or judicial candidate in a 3(B)( I 0) violation suggests that the drafters 
regarded that provision as imposing a very serious obligation. 
Even in the absence of a discussion about the merits of a case, a judge's 
conduct may suggest how a case will be decided. In a Mississippi disciplinary 
action, the facts showed that a judge had made a telephone call soliciting 
political support from a person whom, unknown to the judge, was a litigant 
in a case before him.m Because the contact raised the specter of influence 
peddling, the judge was privately reprimanded. m 
G. Comments About Past Cases 
Judicial candidates in recent elections "have directi) :argeted [past] 
judicial decisions as issues in the campaign."IJ4 For example: 
During a 1994 Democratic primary race for the Texas Supreme Court one 
challenger circulated a brochure picturing an abused woman and portrayed 
the incumbent justice as a judge who voted for wrongdoers rather than 
victims. The obvious implication was that if voters did not like the result in 
129. See discussion of Canon 5( I) supra Part IlI.D. 
130. See TEX. CODE JUD COSDL!CT. Canon 6(H). Texas Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 6(H) 
states in full: "An} lawyer who contributes to the violation of Canons 3B(7). 3B(10). 4D(4), 5 or 6C(2), 
or other relevant provisions of this Code. is subject to disciplinary action by the State Bar of Texas." Id. 
131. TEX. DISCIPLISARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 8.04(a)(6). 
132. See In re Baker. 535 So. 2d 47. 48-49 (Miss 1988) 
133. See id 
134. Justice Craig Enoch. Foreward to Annual Survey afTexas Lall. 48 S.M.U. L. REV. 723,725 
(1995) 
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that case, they needed to elect the challenger in order to produce a different 
result. 135 
839 
Are such statements ethically permissible because they deal with past 
decisions rather than pending or impending cases? Similarly, maya judge 
who dissented in a case discuss that controversy when running for re-election? 
The judge may wish to illustrate his judicial philosophy by referring to the 
dissent, or may desire to identify errors in the majority opinion which the 
judge still believes require correction. 
Statements of the sort described abc)\e may run afoul of Canon 3(B)( II), 
which provides: 
A judge shall not disclose or use, for any purpose unrelated to judicial duties, 
nonpublic information acquired in ajudicial capacity. The discussions. votes, 
positions laken, and wrilings of appel/ule judges and courl persunnel about 
causes are confidences of Ihe courl ulld shall be revealed ollly Ihrough a 
courl 's judgment, a written opinion or Il1 uccurdcmce wilh Supreme Court 
guidelines for a court approved histor~ project.l]b 
Canon 3(B)( II) has been interpreted to mean that a judge on the Court of 
Criminal Appeals or a justice on the Texas Supreme Court may not write a 
newspaper opinion or editorial piece discussing his or her stated position on 
a case that has been finally resolved by the court. IJ ? 
H Discriminatory Bias or Prejudice 
Today, overtly discriminatory statements rarely occur in American 
political campaigns. Rather, when bias and prejudice are present, they 
typically manifest themselves covertly through the use of code words or, 
perhaps, carefully phrased rhetorical questions. While such forms of divisive 
campaigning are not readily associated with judicial elections, it is easy to 
recall widely publicized occasions when judges C''' the bench, in recent years, 
have resorted to the use of demeaning language making clear their disdain for 
members of minority groups,'38 such as homosexuals139 \Vhat if such 
135. Jd. 
136. TEX. CODE kD. CO:\Dl'CT, Canon 3(BII I I) (emphasis added) 
137. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 191 (1996), reprm/ed In 67 TEX. JUD. 
COUNCIL & OFF CT. AD"U:\. TEX. Jl'D. SyS. A~:\. REP. 78 (1995) 
138. See, e.g., In re Agresta, 476 N.E.2d 285, 286 (KY 1(85) (upholding a sanction against a 
judge who used the phrase "nigger in the woodpile" in open court in a case with black defendants); In re 
Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Wis. 1(89) (suspending ajudge for two years for, inter alia, intemperate 
comments, including stereotypical remarks that stigmatiLcd black people). 
139. See Favorable DeCiSIOn/or Judge Ignores Key Facts, DALLAS MORNI"G NEWS, Nov. 2, 1989, 
at 30A, available in 1989 WL 6130219. The article discusses proceedings against ajudge who referred 
to two slain men as" 'queers' who were looking for trouble by 'cruising for teen-agers.'" Id. The judge 
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expressions of bias or prejudice creep into ajudicial race? Does the use of 
such words or conduct, by itself, subject a judge or a judicial candidate to 
discipline? 
The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct does not expressly answer these 
questions. In the courtroom or in the performance of other official duties, a 
judge is obliged to observe a very high standard of conduct and to insist that 
staff members and lawyers appearing before the judge conduct themselves 
accordingly. Canon 3 provides in part that: 
(6) A judge shall not, in the perfonnance of judicial duties. by words 
or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or 
prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, 
sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not knowingly pennit 
staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control to 
do so. 
(7) A judge shall require lawyers in proceed ings before the court to 
refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on 
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or 
socioeconomic status against parties, witnesses, counselor others. This 
requirement does not preclude legitimate advocacy when any of these factors 
is an issue in the proceeding. 140 
Although these provisions are not by their terms applicable to statements 
made during a judicial campaign, they undoubtedly set a standard toward 
which candidates should aspire. Admittedly, the campaign trail is different 
from the courtroom, and a greater range of expression may be defensible in 
an electoral contest than during the course of formal litigation. However, the 
provisions quoted above must be read in conjunction with relevant portions 
of Canon 2(A). Tha: canon admonishes that a "judge ... should act at all 
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary."141 Discriminatory words and conduct fly in the 
face of this rule, for they suggest that the pr~sent or potential occupant of the 
judicial post in question is unable or unwilling to act in an impartial manner. 
In a recent South Dakota case, ajudicial candidate had made statements 
asserting that there was "a collapse of rule of law" and implying that Native 
Americans, blacks, farmers, women and other" 'powerless financially dis-
tressed nonvested' elements of society [were] not being treated fairly and 
impartially by thejudiciary."J42 More specifically, the candidate accused the 
incumbent "of giving 'the most severe of punishments' under the' cruel and 
went on to say" 'I put gays and prostitutes at about the same leveL 
somebody life for killing a prostitute.'" fd. 
140. TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(6)-(7). 
141. /d.. Canon 2(A). 
142. In re Hop"well, 507 N.W.2d 911, 912-14 (SO. 1993) 
And], d be hard put to give 
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deceptive guise of deterrence of crime' [to] 'juvenile Native American 
offenders.' "143 The court found that those comments violated Canon 2(A), 
which requires ajudge or judicial candidate to" 'conduct himself at all times 
in a manner which promotes public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary.' ,,144 Based on those and other violations, the 
attorney was suspended from practice. 145 
Over the last two decades, much ink has been spilt over the issue of 
whether judges may belong to clubs which exclude certain categories of 
members, such as women, blacks, or Jews. In explaining the provision in the 
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct \"hich now clearly condemns 
"membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on 
the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin,"146 the official comment 
states: 
[P]ublic manifestation by a judge of the judge's knowing approval of 
invidious discrimination on any basis gives the appearance of impropriety 
under Canon 2 and diminishes public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary, in violation of Section 2AI47 
It is likely that Texas disciplinary authorities would follow a similar analysis 
with respect to improper discriminatory statements made in a judicial 
campaign. 
[ Statements By Others 
Ajudge may not conveyor "permit others to convey the impression that 
they are in a special position to influence the judge."148 Presumably, a judge 
therefore has an affirmative duty to correct any such misstatements by others 
that occur in the course of a campaign. 
Interestingly, a lav'yer working on a judicia! campaign may also have a 
duty to call upon the judge or judicial candidate to correct any misstatements 
that he or she has made. Rule 8.04(a)(6) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct provides that "[a] lawyer shall not ... knowingly assist 
ajudge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of 
143. Jd. at 913. 
144. Jd at 914. 
145. See id. at918. 
146. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(C) (1990) The parallel provision in the Texas 
Code of Judicial Conduct ditTers slightly. Canon 2(C) of the Texas code states: 'A judge shall not 
knowingly hold membership in any organization that practices discrimination prohibited by law." TEX. 
CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 2(C) 
147. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(C) em!. (1990) 
148. TEX. CODE JuD. CONDUCT, Canon 2(B) 
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judicial conduct or other !aw."149 It seems likely that mere knowledge of a 
misstatement by the judge or the candidate will not be equated with knowing 
assistance and will not trigger whatever remedial duties are inherent in the 
rule, but involvement rising above "mere knowledge" may be treated 
differently. Thus, a lawyer who distributes campaign literature \vhich is 
known to contain a misrepresentation or who knowingly repeats incorrect 
information obtained from the judge or judicial candidate runs a risk of 
discipline. 
IV. SUPPORT FOR OTHER CAMPAIGNS AND POLITICAL PARTIES 
A judge or judicial candidate can do very little to advance directly the 
electoral chances of another candidate running for pub I ic office. ISO Canon 
5(3) prohibits a judge from "authoriz[ing] the public use of his or her name 
endorsing another candidate,"151 and Canon 2(8) prohibits a judge from 
lending the prestige of judicial office to the advancement of private 
interests. 152 These provisions have been construed in Texas to prohibit ajudge 
or judicial candidate from verbally recommending another candidate or even 
asking the voters to consider the candidate. ls3 Undoubtedly, more active 
forms of endorsement will be found to run afoul of these precepts. In In re 
Ovard, the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a 
149. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDCCT 8.04(a)(6). 
150. See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 365 ("Although a non incumbent candidate has never 
been found in violation of ethical standards regulating endorsements, a number of sitting judges have been 
disciplined for participating in and supporting other persons' campaigns fcH Judicial office") 
151. TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT. Canon 5(3). Prior provisions of the Texas Code of Judicial 
Conduct were construed to reach the same result. See Comm. on Jud Ethics. Slate Bar of Tex .. Op. 73 
(1984), reprinted In 56 TEX. JUD. COL'NCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JLD Sys. ANN. REP. 85-86 (1984) 
Finding that ajudge could not publicly endorse a candidate for public ollice. the corr.n,;,tee noted that "the 
public endorsement of another person's candidacy, of necessity, involves the usc of the prestige of the 
judge and the prestige of his office" and that "ajudge's invrlvement In another person's political race 
places the judge in a partisan posture and gives the public cause to question the judge's independence." 
Id. 
The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct draws a distinction not found in the Texas code. The /\BA 
code permits some limited forms of endorsement. Thus, Canon 5(/\)( I )1 b) states the general rule that" a 
judge or a candidate for election or appointment to judicial office shall not publ iell' endorse or publ iell' 
oppose another candidate for public olliee." MODEL CODE OF JeDiCIAL CO~DL'CT Canon 5(/\)(I)(b) 
(1990), but Canon 3(C)( I )(b)(iv) states the exception that a "judge or a candidate subject to publ ic election 
may, except as prohibited by law ... when a candidate for election.. publiciy endorse or publicly oppose 
other candidates for the same judicial office in a public election in which the Judge or judicial candidate 
is running," Id. Canon 3(C)(I)(b)(iv). 
152. See TEX. JUD. CODE CONDUCT, Canon 2(B). 
153. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics. State Bar of Tex., Op. 170 (1994). reprrnted in 66 TEX. JUD. 
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. Sys. A1><N. REp. 126 (1994); see also in re Troy, 306 N.E.2d 203, 
234-36 (Mass. 1973) (discussing ajudge disbarred for numerous ethical infract'lons, including arranging 
and attending political gatherings and serving as a toastmaster at a testimonial for another candidate); In 
re Decker, 1994 WL 897478 at *4-5 (NY Com. Jud. Cond) (admonishing ajudge for publicly supporting 
a county executive's campaign and for improper advertising in his own campaign) 
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judge for endorsing, in several pieces of campaign literature, a candidate to 
succeed himself as justice of the peace following the expiration of his term .15\ 
In one instance, the judge's endorsement \vas contained in the candidate's 
paid political "valentine," in another it was part of the cand idate' s four-page 
"Notice of False Endorsements," and in other instances the endorsement \vas 
included in letters paid for by the candidate or the judge. 155 The Comm iss ion 
found that this conduct constituted "willful and tlagrant" violations of the 
provisions of Canon 7 .156 
ll1ere is authority to similar effect in other jurisdictions. In other states, 
authorities have held that it is improper for a Judge to aid a candidate by 
sending out letters of support,157 hosting a barbeque,158 assisting in the 
fonnulation of campaign strategies,159 purchas ing advertisements,160 or even 
influencing a political party's choice of primary candidates161 
For essentially the same reasons, ajudge or judicial candidate may not 
hand out campaign materials for another candidate or for a political party, 
regardless of whether the materials are accompanied by a verbal endorsement 
or whether an advertisement for the judge or judicial candidate appears in the 
materials. 162 In addition, joint campaign activity by two judges is deemed to 
be impennissible,161 such as mailing sample ballots which give the impression 
that each judge endorses the other. 164 Thus, two or more judges runn ing for 
judicial office at the same time may not jointly sponsor a fund raising event 
or have a politically active group do that for them. 165 
Care must also be exercised with respect to political contributions to 
other campaigns. In general, a contribution is appropriate only "when the 
judge is satisfied that neither the contribution nor the public record thereof 
will receive public attention before the election."166 Presumably, this means 
that the best course for a judge or judicial cand idate is to avoid making such 
154. See Tex. Comm. on Jud. Conduct (Dec 27. 199~) (COP' on file With the Texas Tech Lnw 
Review). 
155. See id 
156. See id 
157. See OfTIce of Discipiinary Counsel v. Capers, 472:-'; 2d 1073. 1073-7.:1 (Ohio 1984) 
158. See In re fvlartin. 434 S.E.2d 262, 263-64 (SC. 199]) iper curiam) 
159. See In re DeFoor. 494 So. 2d 1121, 1121-23 (Flo. 1936) (per curiam) 
160. See In re Stead), 641 A.2d 117, 119 (VI. 1994); .Harlln. 434 SE2d 3t262-64. 
161. See In re Katie. 549 N.E.2d 1039, 1039-40 (lnd l
'
NO) Iper curiam) 
162. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex.. Op. 170 (1994). reprinted in 66 TEX Jl'D. 
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMI". TEX. JUD. SYS. ANN. REp. 126 (1994) 
163. See id. (citing with approval Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex. Op. 100 (1987). 
reprinted in 59 TEX JuD. COlC;CIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. SYS. A"N. REp 78 (1987)) 
164. See In re Pratt. 508 So. 2d 8. 9-10 (Fla. 1987) (per curiam); In re Kay, 508 So. 2d 329, 329-30 
(Fla. 1987) (per curiam) 
165. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 100 (1987). 
166. Comm. on Jud. Ethics. State Bar of Tex., Op. 145 (1992). reprinted In 65 TEX. Jl·D. COU.'iC1L 
& OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JLD SYS. ANN REp 126 (1993). 
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contributions. 167 In addition, a judge cannot display on the judge's vehicle a 
bumper sticker supporting a political candidate. 168 The same rule also likely 
applies to the erection of yard signs endorsing other cand idates. 169 
Because a judge has an obligation to exercise proper supervision over 
official staff members, ajudge must take reasonable steps tu ensure that staff 
members do not engage in forms of political activity which would be 
improper for the judge to engage in directlyYo Accordingly, there is authority 
in Texas that states ajudge should not permit members of the judge's office 
staff "to participate in pol itical activities such as pub lie Iy supporting a 
candidate for election, acting as a campaign manager, and fund raising."I'1 
U[S]uch political activity by a member of a judge's office staff would imply, 
or would be likely to give the appearance of, the judge's support for the 
candidate." m Likewise, authorities suggest, a staff member should not be 
permitted to contribute money to another campaign unless such a contribution 
by the judge would be appropriate. 17) 
The Code of Judicial Conduct does not attempt to regulate the political 
activities of a judge or judicial candidate's spouse.I'l Hmvever, if a judge's 
spouse is a candidate for elective office, the judge faces many of the same 
restrictions that ordinarily limit judicial involvement in the campaign of 
unrelated persons. 175 The judge may attend political events relating to his or 
167. See id. Whether similar restrictions apply in Texas to contributions made to a political party, 
rather than to a specific candidate, is unclear. The American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct contains language not found in the Texas Judicial Code of Conduct. The ABA code provides, 
in relevant part: 
(I) ajudge or a candidate subject to public election may, except as prohibited by la\\' 
(a) at any time 
(i) purchase tickets for and attend political gatherings. 
(ii) idenlil himself or herself as a member of a political ran). and 
(iii) contribute to a political organization .. 
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (1990) 
168. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 136 (199CJ). reprlmed In 62 TEX. JL'D 
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. SYS ANN. REp. 125 (l't90) 
169. See In re Martin, 434 S.E.2d 262, 262-64 (SC. 1993) (per curiam) 
170. See TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT. Canon 3(C)(2) Canon 3(C)(2) provides "A judge shouid 
require staff, court oftlcials and others subject to the judge's direction and control to observe the standards 
of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice in the 
performance of their official duties" Id. According to Canon 8(B)( II) 
The rules prescribing that ajudge "require" certain conduct of others arc. like all of the rules 
in this Code, rules of reason. The use of the term "require" in that context means ajudge is to 
exercise reasonable direction and control over the conduct of those persons subject to the 
judge's direction and control. 
Id., Canon 8(B)(ll) 
171. Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 145 (1992). 
172. Jd 
173. See id. 
174. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 170 (1994), reprinted in 66 TEX. JUD. 
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. Sys. ANN. REP. 126 (1994). 
175. See In re Codispoti, 438 S.E.2d 549, 552-53 (W. Va. 1993) (censuring ajudge for improper 
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her spouse's campaign, but may not speak at those events in support of the 
spouse's campaign, for doing so would violate the rule against endorsements 
and would lend the prestige of judicial office to the advancement of private 
interests. 176 For sim i lar reasons, the judge may not allow the judge's name 
and title to be used in press releases or campaign literature identifying the 
candidate as the judge's spouse, and may not be introduced at the spouse's 
campaign functions by name and title. 177 Presumably, similar restrictions 
apply to a judge's involvement in the campaign of a closely related family 
member other than a spouse. 178 
A reasonable argument can be made that it is unethical for a judge to 
induce his or her spouse to engage in the very activities that the judge is 
prohibited from undertaking. 179 It is a basic principle of legal ethics that one 
cannot do indirectly what one is prohibited from doing directly.180 Thus, Rule 
8.04 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits an 
attorney not only from personally violating the ethics rules but also from 
"do[ing] so through the acts ofanother."181 It would seem that, as a matter of 
sound policy, the same rule should apply to judges. 182 In a decision suggestive 
of this principle, a recent Indiana court reprimanded ajudge for purporting to 
make an improper campaign contribution in the name of his spouse. IS) Of 
course, the law has long abandoned the questionable fiction that the husband 
and the wife are one; and therefore there should be a presumption that a 
spouse has acted independently in undertaking any political activities in which 
he or she has chosen to engage. Some cases have taken the principle against 
indirect unethical conduct to considerable lengths. 184 In a New York 
controversy, ajudge "was admonished for permitting a partnership in which 
he had an interest to contribute to campaigns other than his own."185 
involvement in his wite's judicial campaign and for misleading campaign advertisements); In re 
McGregor, 614 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla 1993) (per curiam) (reprimanding a judge for actively participating 
in his wife's campaign for county clerk of court). 
176. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex .. Op. 180 (1995), reprin/ed In 67 TEX. Jt.:D. 
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMI~. TEX. JCD. SYS. ANN. KEP. 75 (1995) 
177. See id. 
178. See In re Turner. 573 So. 2d 1, 1-2 (Fla. 1990) (repflmanding ajudge for involvement in his 
son's campaign for county judge) 
179. See TEX. DISCIPLI;-;ARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 503(b)II), 804(a)( 1 l. 
180. See id. 
181. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'LCONDCCT 804(a)(I) 
182. Such an approach. in many respects, would be consistent with the rule of judicial ethics which, 
in the context of discussing administrative responsibilities, states that a "judge should require staff, court 
officials and a/hers subjec//o /he judge's direc/ion and con/ro/to observe the standards of fidelity and 
diligence that apply to the judge." TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(2). 
183. See In re Sallee. 579 N.E.2d 75, 76-77 (Ind. 1991) 
184. See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 367 n.57 (discussing In re Devanl, an unreported 1985 
Determination of the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct) 
185. Id. 
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"A judge or judicial candidate ... may indicate support for a political 
party."186 They may also attend political events and may express their views 
on political matters. 187 These latter two actions are subject to the very 
significant limitations imposed by Canon 5 and Canon 3(8)(10) with respect 
to issues that may come before the judicial office sought or held, 188 pledges 
or promises of conduct in office,189 and comments about pending or 
impending proceedings. 190 
One advisory ethics opinion has taken the position that judges may even 
"support a county bond election, designated a 'Ia\\ and order election,' to fund 
an expanded and improved jail facility, a new county criminal courts building. 
and renovation and improvement of civil district and family courts 
facilities."191 Perhaps this is not surprising since judges are permitted to 
engage in activities to improve "the law, the legal system, [and] the 
administration of justice"192 and because, strictly speaking, on the posited 
scenario, the judges would not be lending "the prestige of judicial office to 
advance the private interests of the judge or others."I~J However, judicial 
involvement with other types of ballot issues may be improper, particularly 
where the actions "cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capac itl' to act 
impartially as ajudge"194 or amount to an expression of opinion on any issue 
that may be subject to judicial interpretation. 195 Accordingly, a judge may not 
"actively support a bond election to raise funds to develop a city water 
project."I96 
V. USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES 
Because a judge may not lend the prestige of judicial office to the 
advancement of private interests, "judicial letterhead" may not be used to 
solicit contributions or other support for the judge' 5 campaign. 197 "Of course 
a judge's campaign literature should state the judge's nresent title and 
position. but the use of official judicial letterhead for campaign purposes 
186 TEX CODE JCD. CO~DL:CT. Canon 5(3). 
187. See id. 
188 See discussion supra Pan llLD. 
189 See TEX. CODE JL'D. CO>:DL'CT. Canon 5(2)(1) 
190. See discussion supra Pan !lIT 
191. Comm, on Jud. Ethics. State Bar ofTex,. Op. 82 (1986), repnnti!d In 58 TEX JL:D. COl~CIL 
& OFF, CT, ADMIN. TEX. JCD. S1'S. A>:N. REp, 80 (1986) 
192, TEX. CODE JLiD, CO~DCCT, Canon 4(B), 
193. fd.. Canon 2(B) (emphasis added), 
194, /d. Canon 4(A)(I) 
195. See id" Canon 5(1), 
196. Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar ofTex" Op, 82 (1986) 
197. See Comm. on Jud, Ethics. State Bar of Tex., Op, IJ7 (1990), reprinted In 63 TEX. JL'D. 
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN, TEX. JUD. S1's. A!'iN. REp, 120 (1991) "Judicial letterhead [is] letterhead that 
shows ajudge's title, position. and official address and is suitable for official judicial correspondence" 
fd. 
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could give the appearance that a judge-candidate is attempting to exploit the 
judge'sjudicial position."I98 
One result of this limitation on the use of judicial letterhead is that, in 
some parts of the state, campaign literature has taken on a markedly 
lighthearted look. Far from the heavyhanded appearance of governmental 
stationery, fundraising communications for judicial candidates often resemble 
festive party invitations. One recent mailing in San Antonio, which was not 
atypical, involved a large postcard that, amidst a coil of rope and a scattering 
of stars, depicted a mustachioed character with a cowboy hat, shotgun, and 
star on his chest. 199 The image perhaps looked more like the to\vn sheriff than 
even a frontier judge-\vhich may have been an attempt to convey a subtle 
message on law and order. The text on the invitation cheerfully invited the 
recipient to a fundraiser, stating "Join the Round Up to Keep Judge in 
the Saddle."20o In terms of suggested donations, it read: "Covipokes $50, 
Wrangler Hosts $500, Traildriver Sponsor $250, Lil' Cowpokes free.''201 In 
addition to music, the event offered "vittles" and entertainment in the form of 
"Shootin' by the South Texas Gunfighters.":'" Another imitation, from a 
different judge, had a picture ofa team mascot (a dragon) on the front cover, 
then invited the recipient to hockey game, complete with a reception and a 
silent auction offering the chance to bid on a weekend in Las Vegas, 
autographed team souvenirs, and a "Steer (Dead or Alive)."20) A pair of 
tickets to the game were enclosed "complements of' the judge.2M A fastidious 
ethicist might argue that such insouciant campaign literature is undignified 
and therefore runs afoul to the duties under Canons 1 and 2 to promote the 
integrity of the judiciary.20s But it is hard to imagine that such advertising 
does any real harm to the public image of the judiciary. What is wrong with 
thinking that ajudge has a sense of humor, can enjoy a good time when away 
from the bench, and likes music, good food, or sports? 
The prohibition against improper use of public resources encompasses 
much more than judicial stationery. Thus, ajudge who improperly uses office 
198. Id. 
199. Ad on file with the Texas Tech Law Revie\\ 
200. See id. 
201. See Id. 
202. See id 
203. See id. 
204. See id. 
205. See TEX. CODE JCD. CO~D\JCT, Canon I Canon I provides 
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society A judge 
should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and 
should personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary is preserved. The provisions of this Code are to be construed and applied to further 
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facilities and employees for political purposes may be found to violate the 
canon requiring a judge to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in 
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary or other standards. 206 In In re 
Devine, the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly admonished a 
judge for using his chambers for a gathering of supporters to announce his 
intention to run for Congress. 207 "The judge's chambers, an area designated 
for the judge's benefit in the furtherance of his judicial duties, is not to be 
used as a forum for the judge's personal pursuit of public office."208 The 
Commission found that the holding of the political gathering was a wilful 
violation of Canon 2(B), which prohibits lending the prestige of judicial office 
to the advancement of private interests. 209 
VI. CONCLUSIO~ 
A candidate for judicial office faces a daunting array of obstacles. First, 
he or she must identifY a race which, because of the existence of a vacancy or 
the weakness of the incumbent, it is possible to \vin. Then, the candidate must 
rally supporters, raise contributions, comply with financial disclosure 
requirements, attract favorable attention, achieve name recognition, and cajole 
potential voters at what often seems to be an endless array of public events. 
Finally, the candidate must persuade the electorate to tum out at the polls and 
to mark the right box or pull the right lever in numbers sufficient to surpass 
all opponents. To add to this host of obstacles a tangle of ethical restrictions, 
which limit what the candidate may say on his or her own behalf or what types 
of support others may provide, might strike some as unfair. 2IO But that is the 
American way, and, in general, the system works. The tradition of the 
American judiciary, on the whole, has been one of honor, integrity, hard work, 
and fairness. 'he ethics rules that preclude judges and judicial candidates 
from engaging in inappropriate political activity make an important 
contribution to continuing that tradition and, througn it, to advancing the 
administration of justice. The ethcal limitations applicable to political 
campaigns, perhaps more than ever, need to be followed and enforced with the 
same passion that accompanies other aspects of the political process. If they 
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are, the judiciary will take an important step toward weathering the current 
storm of judicial criticism that recently has attracted so much attention and 
threatened public confidence in the courts. 
